
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Chief of Staff

Official:

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WRITER'S GUIDE

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Commander
U.S.Army Intelligence Center and School
ATTN: ATSI-TD-MIM
Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7000

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

Domestic: $6.50/year
Foreign: $8.15/year

Single issues are $3.00 and $3.75 respectively.

Additional subscription information can be obtained by writing:

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

Free Unit Subscriptions can be obtained by writing:

Commander
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School
ATTN: ATSI-TD-MIM
Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7000

Military Intelligence, an authorized publication of the U. S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Ariz., is published quarterly under provisions of AR 310-2, AR 310-3 and the TRADOC Professional Bulletin Policy Letter. This professional bulletin does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. Information in this publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Use of the third person pronoun "he" and any of its forms is intended to

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COVER: This issue's cover salutes WORLDWIDE INTELLIGENCE. Design by Dutch Poggemeyer

include both masculine and feminine genders. Inquiries, letters to the editor, manuscripts and supporting graphics should be sent to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-TD-MIM, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7000. Telephone autovon 879-0674/0675 or commerical (602) 538-0674/0675. **Controlled Circulation** postage paid at Washington, D.C. **ISSN 0026-4028.**

from the Commander

Major General Julius Parker Jr.

How we intend to fight in the foreseeable future is a matter of record. Army and Air Force leadership agree the AirLand Battle Doctrine is our doctrine out to the year 2015.

AirLand Battle Doctrine dictates a strong, irreplaceable role for intelligence. The intelligence system is one that is geared to reveal the enemy's disposition, capabilities and intentions throughout the battlefield. It shows existing and potential vulnerabilities of the enemy, as well as those of the friendly commander.

Uncertainty is the puzzle intelligence professionals deal with every day. The intelligence organization at each level deals with this issue by creating an all-source environment to bring diverse information together for interpretation. The analyst integrates the seemingly insignificant bits of information from multiple sources to produce an overall picture of the battlefield. The commander can then use his combat power to maneuver forces and to identify and attack high payoff targets.

The term "all-source" means the analyst can access and integrate information from the most sensitive national collection systems to the soldier fighting on the front lines. While work may be done in specialized areas (SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, etc.), our intelligence functions of situation and target development, electronic warfare and counterintelligence will not tolerate isolation by discrete function.

Situation development is the process by which intelligence is developed. Information collected, then integrated into an all-source product provides an estimate of the situation and a projection of enemy intentions in time for the commander to select the most effective friendly course of action.

Another critical task in the tactical all-source environment is that of providing targeting data for both lethal and nonlethal systems. All-source intelligence provides the commander with timely and accurate locations of enemy weapons systems, units and activities which may impact on current or future operations. These targets may be passed to maneuver, field artillery, tactical air or EW elements for action. The capability must exist for the expeditious dissemination of time sensitive information.

EW exploits, disrupts and deceives the enemy command and control while protecting friendly use of communications and noncommunications systems. When integrated with fire and maneuver, through all-source intelligence, it becomes a significant force multiplier.

Protecting our forces from surprise includes two elements. The first, all-source intelligence, allows the commander to know the enemy's activities and intentions. The second, counterintelligence, helps deprive the enemy commander of the intelligence he needs to take the friendly force by surprise. Each of the major tasks derived from the IEW mission is essential to success on the battlefield.

The intelligence system collects and analyzes information from all sources. It links all levels of command together through the fusing of multisource information at the division and corps TOC support elements and the EAC intelligence centers. Together these elements provide rapid and reliable information to the tactical commander.

To meet the tactical commander's needs on the battlefield, the MI professional must have the ability and knowledge to accurately assess the enemy by thinking like him. He must be able to analyze information, identify intelligence gaps and task the proper system to obtain the information needed to support or refute his assessment of the enemy's intentions. He must continually collect, analyze, integrate and evaluate information to update the situation and predict future enemy activities. Finally, he must get that information to the commander on the battlefield. In short, our MI professionals must know their enemy and the four phase intelligence cycle: directing, collecting, processing and disseminating.

The mission of the Intelligence Center and School is to train all-source MI professionals capable of making the leap from recalling information to the cognitive effort of analyzing single-source data and producing all-source intelligence. To accomplish this goal, small group instruction and practical exercises are being increased in all programs of instruction (officer and enlisted). The officer courses are focused on producing officers capable of succeeding as S2s and commanders, the ultimate goals of many young MI officers. Offense/defense and IPB instruction will be combined in both the MIOBC and the OAC Common Core. The students will see how the IPB process is integrated into the planning and the conduct of combat operations. In furtherance of integrated training, an All-Source Analysis Training Facility (ASTF) is under construction at Fort Huachuca. The ASTF will provide training for entry through advanced levels of ASAS operations. In conjunction with the newly constructed Life Cycle Software Support Center (LCSSC), we will be able to develop and update ASAS related training material and courseware for both instruction at the school and our units in the field. ***Toujours en avant*** .... **Always Out Front!**

from the CSM

Command Sergeant Major Robert H. Retter

So often, we in the military are required to move on and enter a new and different phase of our career. When this happens, we often leave our current assignment with some relief that it is over and a sense of anticipation or excitement about what lies ahead. I am about to embark on a new phase in my career having been selected as Command Sergeant Major of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Both my family and I are excited about what lies ahead. We look forward to the new assignment with a great sense of anticipation. However, we leave the Home of Military Intelligence with some reluctance. This has been my best assignment. Much has been accomplished with and for the noncommissioned officers of Military Intelligence. And, quite a little is left yet to be done. I leave with the complete confidence that the MI NCO Corps has the ability to do what needs to be done no matter who occupies the position I now hold.

During my tenure here, I and the MI Corps have had the good fortune to be led by Major General Julius Parker Jr. He did not just *allow* the NCOs to take care of NCO business in MI. He, in fact, *insisted* that we do so. He may have communicated his desire for the MI NCOs to take action or indicated approval on NCO-developed initiatives through me; but the credit for our achievements belongs to MI NCOs collectively. The first Chief of the Military Intelligence Corps not only gave us the latitude to act, he backed his commitment to the MI NCOs with resources and his personal support. The willingness of the MI NCOs to produce, coupled with the Chief's backing are the real factors which made it possible for me to participate in the remarkable progress we have made since December 1984.

My recollections of the events of July 1, 1987, as I was privileged to represent the MI NCO Corps during the activation of the Military Intelligence Corps still evokes a proud emotional response in me. Passing the new Corps flag from the DCSINT to the first Chief of the Corps was easily the highest public honor which has ever been afforded me personally and may earn me a footnote in the MI Corps history. On that day, we also passed a guidon to the first Commandant of the Military Intelligence Corps Noncommissioned Officers Academy as we activated that organization. Having earlier consolidated advanced NCO training, we now have an NCO organization, commanded by an NCO, which is charged with the future quality of NCO leadership within MI. Having observed the progress of the Academy and the improving quality of soldiers passing through for training, I can leave this job confident in the ability of the MI NCOs to carry on.

MI NCOs enroute to or assigned to key billets such as G2 Sergeants Major, MI Unit Command Sergeants Major or key staff positions now have a short Pre-Assignment Course available to update them on critical developments which will assist them in their new positions. Key NCOs are provided updates on doctrine, personnel and force structure, training, new systems and special interest items specific to their respective assignments. This effort too, was an NCO initiative in which it was my privilege to assist.

I am proud of the achievements of the MI NCO Corps during my assignment as the first MI Corps Sergeant Major. I leave for a new position which expands the scope of my efforts to 12 schools located on 10 posts. I will have an opportunity to participate in the efforts of NCOs across the Army. The scope of my efforts may change, but not the focus. I have been privileged to serve during extraordinary times with an extraordinary group of soldiers. I can move on to CAC knowing that as we enter the Army's Year of the NCO, the Military Intelligence Corps NCO is poised to move forward.

Behind the Lines

Before going into the usual material found in this column we would like to say a farewell to our editor, Captain William A. Purciello. For two years, Bill has guided the efforts of the staff and raised the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin to a publication of enviable reputation.

This issue presents an olio of military intelligence involvement around the world. From the actions of a little-known traveling salesman in Central America to the very up-to-date involvement in peacekeeping activities in the Sinai, MI was there. We go from reconnaissance on muleback in the mountain trails of Colombia to the Army Intelligence Master Plan for the 21st century.

Jamie Bisher relates the unusual tale of a stationery salesman's undercover activities in Colombia and Captain Forrest L. Davis uses his experiences as a member of the Sinai peacekeeping force to assess those operations. Dino Brugioni takes us into space with the first steps into high-level reconnaissance and Major Donald R. Cook introduces us to intelligence development plans for the 21st century.

The Staff

Writer's Award Nominee

In accordance with the guidelines for the Military Intelligence annual Writer's Award Program published in the January-March 1986 issue, the editoral staff is pleased to announce that Major Donald R. Cook's article, "The Army Intelligence Master Plan: A Path to the 21st Century," will be the nominee for January 1989. The winner of the 1989 Writer's Award will be announced in the April 1990 issue.

feedback . . .

Dear Editor:

In reference to Captain Forrest L. Davis' article, "Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operations: Balancing the Variables," in this issue of ***Military Intelligence****, I am a little uneasy with his comments in his first paragraph: "Once deployed, the peacekeeping unit receives little or no external intelligence support and the unit intelligence system functions virtually alone." This observation is presumably based upon his experiences in the Sinai. The extent to which a U.S. Army unit is deprived of higher command and national intelligence products will inevitably be a fine balance between the perception of the threat and the very important need to remain neutral and therefore credible. In the Sinai one assumes the threat is considered low. I personally find it difficult to believe that, after the Beirut tragedy, any U.S. government would be prepared to dispatch its forces into this difficult area of politico/military activity without the necessary intelligence services. Within U.N. auspices at the military area command level (i.e. single nation formation) it has been my experience that national assets are available. FM 100-20/AFM 2-xy, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, does address this problem: "If the peacekeeper is not authorized to place requirements on the full range of national intelligence resources, he must at a minimum have their products."*

The fortress mentality is, as the author points out, inappropriate in most peacekeeping operations. However, recent doctrine in force protection in low intensity conflict offers a more subtle approach to security enhancement. Use of various technical aids, sensors, etc., can improve security without the "sandbag syndrome" taking hold.

Major N. J. Newell, UK
Low Intensity Task Group
USAICS



Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operations: Balancing the Variables

by Captain Forrest L. Davis

Peacekeeping operations greatly amplify the role of the intelligence officer in both training and operations. The nature of peacekeeping demands a complete mental reorientation on the part of each soldier and the intelligence officer is intimate in affecting this change. Once deployed, the peacekeeping unit receives little or no external intelligence support and the unit intelligence system functions virtually alone. Soldiers and patrols become the primary source of timely information. The intelligence officer recommends all reconnaissance efforts, supervises the processing and dissemination of reports, and redirects patrols to fill gaps. The system he directs is the first line of defense against threats and is a critical factor in determining mission success.

The probability of continued deployment of U.S. forces in support of peace initiatives is high. The cessation of the Iran-Iraq war will most likely not involve the deployment of U.S. troops as peacekeepers; however, it does point to a continued trend in diplomacy. Nations best trust each other when a neutral party separates their forces.

Verification rests with the peacekeepers and their mission statement is usually confined to two areas: observe and report. Observing falls on the shoulders of the individual soldier. Reporting is a function of the command's intelligence system. Security is an implied mission. Yet each area is defined by fluid parameters — parameters largely determined through the efforts of the intelligence section.

Parameters

The atmosphere of the peacekeeping environment places great strain on the average tactical command for several reasons. First, there are no "enemies." Yet under many circumstances, the dangers are just the same. The atmosphere is subtly hostile as the antagonists' old wounds are forgotten slowly. Each watches the other as well as the peacekeeping force and an air of suspicion surrounds even the most harmless actions. Compound this with the likelihood that some elements do not desire peace and may possibly target the peacekeepers to shorten its prospects, and the true peacekeeping climate becomes evident.

Further, leaders and soldiers must reorient their perspectives and assume an attitude which makes them "courteous, but cautious...careful, but not paranoid." "Rules of Engagement" almost always demand both a measured and reactive response to a threat. That is, shoot only if shot at — and then only in a volume sufficient to neutralize the immediate danger.

Second, the command does not con-

duct "intelligence" operations nor does it include an "intelligence section." Intelligence is referred to as "information"; intelligence officers become "information officers." Sections are not authorized to receive, process or store classified information. They focus their efforts upon analyzing reports obtained from within the command.

Intelligence support systems likewise evaporate. Under most circumstances, the command is without the traditional SIGINT or IMINT support they have learned to expect from higher headquarters. In an effort to compensate, diplomatic authorities instruct the command to rely upon higher, multinational headquarters and the host country. This is helpful, but these activities seldom are capable of providing the type of information needed to ensure the security of the command against terrorism or other low-intensity threats.

Third, mission success and the security of the command depend almost entirely upon the observer skills of the soldier and the leadership of the fire team or squad leader. Observing each former antagonist is the mission of peacekeepers and, in the absence of other systems, human intelligence is the only source. The same holds true for security information. If the command needs intelligence, it must literally go out and get it.

Taken together, the parameters for which peacekeeping units must train include:

* an atmosphere of a tense peace complete with suspicion and potential danger;

* little or no intelligence support from U.S. agencies, higher headquarters or the host country; and

* a dependence upon the attitude, perspective and observer skills of the individual soldier.

Throughout the tour, the command will be forced to balance the political requirements of the mission against the security needs of the unit. This is no small requirement and units usually begin concentrated training not later than 90 days prior to deployment.

Challenges

Leadership is the most critical variable in any training plan and preparation for peacekeeping is no exception. The intelligence officer, however, plays a unique role in predeployment training and is key in three areas:

* Reorienting the perspectives of the soldiers and leaders.

* Helping design peacekeeping peculiar systems and procedures.

* Patrolling.

The intelligence officer is often looked upon as the historical "smart guy" and the unit will likely look to him for political, social and economical explanations of the conflict. Additionally, they will look to him for a definition of the threat.

The intelligence officer helps reorient soldier perspectives by teaching the conflict from the perspective of the antagonists. He emphasizes the root causes of the conflict and can bring the war closer to the soldier by illustrating its effects on a single family. He can create empathy for each side. And, finally, he can logically place the conflict within the context of U.S. interest, stressing that the command is neither pro-this antagonist nor pro-that antagonist but adamantly pro-American. His contribution reinforces the neutral perspective needed in peacekeepers.

The intelligence officer is also key in defining the threat but must be careful to ensure he is not misunderstood. Infantrymen are geared toward moving, shooting and communicating, with particular emphasis on shooting. A terrorist environment may appear "high adventure." But, as most experienced soldiers will point out, it is usually "99 percent boredom with a one percent potential for chaos."

If the intelligence officer overemphasizes the threat or fails to place it within the larger context of uneventful, everyday life, the soldiers will revert to their combat training. The consequences of a "go to war" perspective can be devastating.

For example, in preparing for the deployment to Puerto Rico, an intelligence officer briefed the activities of the four to five terrorist groups known to be active on the island. He stressed how the unit would be an acceptable target. In response, the soldiers "leaned forward in the foxhole." Two weeks after their deployment, however, with no obvious threat present, soldiers and leaders became lax in executing antiterrorism security measures. Fortunately, the unit redeployed to CONUS before their laxity posed a vulnerability.

This same lesson was learned by a peacekeeping force in the Middle East, only their reorientation occurred after an accidental discharge fatally wounded a soldier. Why was a perimeter guard's weapon locked and loaded? He thought he had heard a terrorist.

Soldiers listen to the unit S2. In orienting the soldier's perspective toward the threat, the S2 must emphasize that everyone be "careful, but not paranoid."

Few conventional techniques will serve the unit conducting the peacekeeping mission. Fortifying a base camp will not guarantee security (nor will it be tolerated by the host government). Host nations desire to see routines in the operations of peacekeepers and become inordinately suspicious when routines are broken. Sick or even wounded men, women and children will be brought to remote observation posts seeking medical attention. Soldiers occupying night observation posts will report strange meetings in the middle of the desert. Mines left over from the conflict will be scattered about and the local populace will be eager to point out their locations.

The intelligence officer does not design solutions to all of these problems, but he does play a vital role in determining command options. He helps determine solutions by defining the variables.

For example, in security matters the intelligence officer balances probable threat tactics with probable host-country responses. In so doing, he can identify those security measures which will counter the threat but not excite the host. Considering relations with the local populace, the intelligence officer identifies those elements from whom contact can be expected and forewarns soldiers occupying remote observation posts. By reviewing the recent activities of the population, he assists in determining the level of support to be given them and the procedures to be followed when they approach. The populace is the key terrain of peacekeeping; but like all actions in this climate, the peacekeepers' response must be measured and balanced. The intelligence officer is a key contributor toward this end.

Mounted, dismounted and aerial patrols are the primary collection activities of peacekeepers. Coupled with the occupation of observation posts, they constitute the chief source

of information both in verifying adherence to the treaty and ensuring the continued security of the command.

The intelligence officer is involved in every aspect of patrolling. He defines the soldier's target. He recommends patrol techniques consistent with the peacekeeping image. He identifies who should conduct what type of patrol and when. He receives all patrol reports and, if part of a battalion task force, is one of the few people fully aware of every activity within the sector.

Peacekeeping patrolling requires the use of different techniques and the intelligence officer must be sensitive to these needs. For example, camouflage, stealth and actions at danger areas are normal patrol activities. But under certain circumstances, such as when traversing a local village, these activities will arouse suspicion or even fear. Carrying weapons at the ready may be routine; however, in some cultures, people consider it offensive.

Finally, when particular information is needed, it is the intelligence officer who balances the variables and recommends the proper strategy. If the command desires to test local water supplies, he determines how to best gather samples. If command interest is focused upon patrol boat activities, such as in the Sinai, he will choose observation locations and augment the patrol with special equipment, such as NODs or ground surveillance radars.

Clearly, the intelligence officer's role in peacekeeping collection operations is significant. To be effective, however, he must understand friendly operations, the political mission and the habits of the local populace, military and police. He must be able to balance these factors and recommend solutions.

Defining the future boundaries of peacekeeping is beyond the scope of this article. Considering the multitude of variables impacting upon safe and successful operations, perhaps peacekeeping can never be reduced to a specific set of soldier drills. Suspicion, little or no outside support and an unparalleled dependence upon the observation and diplomatic skills of the individual soldier each serve to ensure different circumstances and various solutions.

What will remain certain, however, is the significant role assumed by the intelligence officer and section. Their contributions impact daily upon the operations of the command and, to a large degree, serve as "peacekeeping multipliers," drawing the line between crisp success and satisfactory performance.

*Captain Forrest L. Davis served in Sinai, Egypt with the Multinational Force and Observers as Airborne Battalion S2. He is the author of "Countering Terrorism in the Trenches," **Infantry**, November-December 1987. He is a graduate of the Univ. of Texas of El Paso and the Military Intelligence Officers Advanced Course. He is currently a student in the Postgraduate Intelligence Program, Defense Intelligence College.*

Nachalnik Razvedki: The Red "Two"

by Lieutenant Colonel Richard N. Armstrong

In the summer of 1943, German forces hoped to resume an offensive drive to victory on the Eastern Front. Red Army troops were fully prepared to repulse the enemy offensive. On July 2, 1943, the Soviet High Command informed the Central and Voronezh Front commands to expect a German assault in the Kursk salient between July 3rd and 6th.

The Voronezh Front commander called his army commanders to a late night meeting on July 4th. After the meeting, General Mikhail Efimovich Katukov, commander of the Ist Guards Tank Army, decided to watch an English film. The commander's enjoyment of the film was interrupted by a staff officer who reported that part of the German forces were advancing in the attack and a few had reached the first sector.[1]

The staff officer reporting the German attack was the *Nachalnik Razvedki*, Colonel Aleksei Mikhailovich Sobolev. The *Nachalnik Razvedki*, or chief of intelligence, is the equivalent of our S2 or G2 staff position.[2] Sobolev began the war as a major and served as the senior assistant to the Chief of Intelligence for the 33rd Army. Rising to the rank of colonel, Sobolev served as the Chief of Intelligence for the Ist Guards Tank Army from April 1943 to May 1945. His length of tour in this prestigious tank formation under a demanding commander and multiple references to him in senior officers' memoirs offer a testimonial to his effectiveness.

By understanding past Soviet experience and the empirical basis for development of Soviet intelligence on today's battlefield, we will gain some insight into the role of intelligence in past Red Army and present Soviet command decisions. By specifically reviewing Sobolev's experiences, we may broaden our expectations on how a Soviet commander may use his chief of intelligence.

In order to survive the war with the invading Germans, the Red Army set up a staff mechanism for collecting lessons learned during the course of the war and passing these lessons to commanders and units. The publication of the **Collection of Materials for the Study of War Experiences** was a primary means for dissemination. In the second volume dated September-October 1942, lessons in intelligence were discussed. The lessons criticized the lack of control by commanders and chiefs of intelligence that resulted in deceptive practices by reconnaissance

elements. The study provided the following example: "Having arrived at an enemy wire obstruction, the scouts often went to ground, and at dawn they returned with the standard report: 'The reconnaissance was conducted without any results.'"[3] The study's conclusion on this point was "the more rapid the commanders of formations and staffs at all levels transfer from paper methods of reconnaissance leadership to direct work on the terrain with those involved, the sooner positive results will be seen."[4]

In line with the direct observations of the experience study, the Red Army's 1942 *Staff Service Field Regulation* defined the responsibilities of the chief of intelligence and his staff section in the various levels of command. The intelligence section was expected to:

* collect and study information on the enemy, terrain and population in the area of enemy occupation;
* organize and task all types of reconnaissance and observation efforts according to a chief of staff approved plan;
* prepare intelligence summaries;
* prepare signal codes for intelligence units in the field;
* disseminate enemy information within the headquarters, to higher and subordinate headquarters, and adjacent units; and
* study enemy tactics, equipment capabilities and readiness, and maintain enemy battle strength.[5]

The maps of the intelligence section were required to contain the most detailed and current information about the location and activity of the enemy on the front, the disposition of his reserves, activities in the rear and the air situation.

Annotations of incoming information were marked by source letter code (figure 1). The listing of sources illustrated the diversity, redundancy and capabilities Red Army "two's" had at their disposal. The Red Army, within the limits of 1940's technologies, had a multidisciplined collection approach, even by modern standards.

Prisoner of War	P
Documents	D
Commander's Reconnaissance	KR
Observation	N
Air Reconnaissance	A
Photographic Reconnaissance	F
Infantry Reconnaissance	PR
Cavalry Reconnaissance	K
Artillery Reconnaissance	ART
Artillery Instrument Reconnaissance	AIR
Tank	T
Engineer	I
Chemical	KH
Agents	AG
Telephone Tapping	TP
Radio Direction-Finder	RP
Local Population	M

Map posting noted the time of receipt of the various reports and sources, for example:

P		RP	
15.7	10.45	27.10	18.10

(Day, Month) (Hour)

All information requiring verification was accompanied by a question mark.[6]

Figure 1

The regulation recommended all field maps be in code — a practice that is continued today. For security reasons, conventional symbols and map graphics are not normally used on working maps or papers, particularly if the product is not intended for distribution outside the unit.[7] Cryptic and improvised symbols are especially important in forward units as they offer a measure of operations security against the casual observer or the loss of working maps. A modern day S2 should bear this point in mind when dealing with a captured Soviet map or overlay.

The Red Army used a thin, opaque waxed paper for overlays. The details of enemy and friendly troop dispositions and two or three local landmarks were entered in full on the waxed paper, or the intersection of grid coordinates were used to accurately superimpose the waxed paper on the map.

For uniformity in designating local landmarks such as woods, groves and hills, an orientation diagram was prepared in cooperation with the chiefs of the various sections. Commanders down to company or battery level received the diagram. Designated landmarks provided quick points of reference despite the practice of coding map graphics.

The intelligence summary prepared by the intelligence section provided current, detailed information about the enemy. The summary followed a conventional sequence. Part I stated the general situation and enemy activities to the front of the friendly unit. The second part showed the disposition and nature of enemy activities along the front with reference to directions if attacking, from right to left if defending. The source and time of information was indicated. The narrative also identified the degree of engineer preparation of positions or the limits of advance. Subsequent parts listed spot reports on enemy air force and depth of enemy disposition and reserves acquired from the various collection sources. The last part of the summary stated conclusions on enemy actions, composition, location and groupings. Information which required further verification, clarification or collection was identified, and collection means were allocated. Upon completion, the intelligence summary was signed by the chief of staff, the headquarters military commissar and the chief of intelligence.

The chief of intelligence reported all information to the chief of staff and in certain cases directly to the commander. As specified in the 1942 ***Field Service Regulation***, the staff had to prepare for the commander "reliable and methodically arranged data" on the situation, with conclusions to enable him to reach a combat decision. "The nature of these particulars submitted to the commander will, in each case, be based on actual fact. Quite often, the commander required only answers to certain questions."[8]

In preparation for the 3d Mechanized Corps' upcoming battle for Rzhev in November 1942, General David Abramovich Dragunskii, who served as Katukov's chief of intelligence, wrote, "General Katukov and Chief of Staff Nikitin in those days did not give me a minute's rest, demanding...new information about the enemy grouping, about their activities and intentions."[9] Aggressiveness and timeliness had already become a hallmark of Soviet intelligence.

If sufficient time was available for the preparation of offensive action, reports to the commander ideally furnished the following elements of information about the enemy:

* Place and nature of the action and the extent to which air force and mobile troops were active.

* Strength, composition and disposition in front and on the flanks of the given formation; unit identification; location of command posts; dividing lines between units and their battle order.

* Availability of reserves and their probable course of action.

* Fighting power and morale.

* Density of the front, the strongest and the most vulnerable points in the battle lines.

* When and where enemy action could be expected.

* New enemy equipment and tactics.

* Nature of the defense layout.[10]

* Location of the main enemy force whose destruction would ensure victory; any possibility of destroying the enemy piecemeal; the best line of attack to ensure the enemy's defeat; points of stiffest opposition and its nature; and the enemy's probable intentions.[11]

In December 1943, in preparation for the Zhitomir-Berdichev operation, Katukov held a war council with his chief of staff, chief of operations and Sobolev, chief of intelligence, in which he wargamed on a map the possible enemy courses of action.

From Sobolev's first days as chief of intelligence, Katukov required him to perform in the enemy's role. As Katukov remarked in his memoirs, "At any minute he (Sobolev) must know what "his" forces intend to do, and give accurate information about the area of their concentration."[12]

Sobolev showed where he would move "his" forces by outlining the area of the German concentration. He told the tank commander that while the move would take three to four days, it would enable the tank army to move also.[13] When Katukov demanded to know where Sobolev (acting as the enemy) would strike at the tank army's flank, Sobolev said, "right here," and marked the spot on the map. Katukov gave the order to put the covering detachments in that spot.[14]

Following the decision of the commander, the chief of staff organized the staff to plan the battle. The commander would tell the chief of staff what information he needed, when he needed it and what forces and means could be used to conduct the reconnaissance. Acting on instructions from the chief of staff, the chief of intelligence immediately organized collection with the following considerations:

* Not to disperse the efforts of the reconnaissance groups, but direct them to obtain such information necessary for analytical conclusions.

* Assign additional tasks to reconnaissance units at the proper time during the reconnaissance itself.

* Promptly replace missing reconnaissance troops or those which have accomplished their tasks.

* Dispatch fresh reconnaissance units to perform new tasks which could not be performed by reconnaissance units already in the field. For this purpose, a reconnaissance reserve had to be maintained.[15].

Sobolev's role in reconnaissance illustrates how involved Red Army staff officers became in operations. Early studies concluded: "In those staffs where inexperienced intelligence personnel cannot plan reconnaissance, the chief of staff and the commander himself personally are obliged to demonstrate and teach how this is done. The experience of war confirms fully the vitality of the requirement of the field regulation about the fact that the commander himself personally or the chief of staff is obligated to assign the order for reconnaissance. It is not at all permissible to transfer the trust of this function to inadequately prepared persons."[16]

Later in the war, when the chiefs of intelligence had developed more experience, they often moved from the headquarters to get a more personal sensing of the battle. For example, just prior to an operation in mid-January 1945, Katukov, his chief of staff and Sobolev visited the forward detachments. The units were in march column waiting to be committed. Katukov wished them luck and embraced the lead battalion commander. Sobolev went with the battalion commander to give him the latest intelligence for the battle.

As the situation shifted from planning to preparation for combat, the chief of intelligence required a subtle shift in information emphasis and had to determine:

* what information, in addition to that required by the commander and chief of staff, might possibly be needed for the thorough, accurate appraisal of enemy strength;

* what data on-hand should be checked or confirmed;

* what information could be provided by intelligence units already in the field, by advance units, artillery, adjacent units and higher headquarters;

* what additional tasks could be assigned to reconnaissance units already in the field;

* what further information could fresh reconnaissance units obtain; and

* how to maintain uninterrupted intelligence.[17]

Continuity in conducting intelligence collection can be seen as another hallmark of the Red Army that continues today in the Soviet Army. Continuity required daily, intense study of the situation. Continuity meant the capability and flexibility to control the collection assets and coordinate the different types of collection means for complementing collection.

In contemporary intelligence language, the collection plan indicated:

* the object of the reconnaissance according to the task of the formation, all available information about the enemy, what information must be obtained and where and within what time;

* the task of each intelligence collection, the purpose of the intelligence, the direction or area to which collecting should be conducted, the time limits of the intelligence, what the collector is to do after completing the task, in what area prisoners should be captured for interrogation purposes;

* dispatch of staff officers with reconnaissance units, when necessary (the "G2" himself was subject to dispatch on critical missions or tasks); and

* the means and time of delivering of reports from reconnaissance units

(radio, aircraft, combat vehicle, motorcycles, mounted or foot messengers, message collecting points). All these means are still available on the modern battlefield when communications fail to stretch the necessary distances.

In the course of the battle or operation, the collection plan was elaborated and developed. The degree of specification in the collection plan depended on the time available for development. If time was insufficient, the collection plan would be merely noted on a map and in the chief of intelligence's personal field book. The collection plan was an operational document of the command post and approved by the chief of staff with no circulation outside the headquarters.[18]

One of the most important sources of information about the enemy, according to the *Staff Field Service Regulation* and the testimony of chiefs of intelligence, was the interrogation of prisoners and deserters.[19] The prisoner was a major source of information for the rifle armies that were in constant contact along the front line. The *poisk*, or hunt, raids were carried out by experienced and dedicated reconnaissance teams to capture individual soldiers or small groups of soldiers in the forward edge of the battle area or close behind it.

Before dispatching a "hunter" group, a careful study of the enemy deployment, the location of their command and observation posts, and their headquarters and communications centers was conducted. Key to a successful mission was knowledge of the routine in the chosen target, such as place and time of sentry shifts, mess hours and rest times.[20]

The depth of penetration into the German rear area by hunters depended on the distance to the target and the nature of the terrain. As a rule, missions did not exceed 10 to 15 kilometers and were usually three to six kilometers. The groups consisted of six to 12 scouts, including two to three sappers and operated behind the German lines for several days.

Prisoners taken this way were called "tongues," and the hunt patrol's missions were playfully referred to as "linguistics."[21] The chief of intelligence would often personally direct the interrogation of prisoners. Officer prisoners were often taken to the commander. The capture of "tongues," especially in periods when the front line took on a positional character, became a highly difficult and dangerous affair. The hunt raids used widely during World War II continue to be emphasized in modern exercise practice. The Soviets still seek a "tongue" to verify or clarify their information.

Captured German documents, correspondence and publications provided valuable intelligence material. Division and corps headquarters would study in detail only those documents which were of direct practical value to the unit and its particular situation. All documents, especially enemy field orders, topographical maps and overlays, and field coding and ciphers were immediately forwarded to higher headquarters.[22]

When combat documents about the enemy were received, the chief of intelligence would be personally involved with the more important items. The documents were subject to careful examination for comparison with information already on hand and with records of previous enemy situations.

The intelligence section also checked the extent to which the new data confirmed suppositions and evaluations regarding the enemy. The reliability of the information was determined. If any doubts arose as to the information's reliability, it was verified immediately, either by dispatching fresh reconnaissance units or by assigning additional tasks to those already in the field. The German documents were appraised for important information on Soviet troops and what the Germans knew about the Soviet situation. All information revealing the actual situation and intention of the enemy was periodically compiled and summarized. Information received from human intelligence sources always had to be verified unless previously confirmed by data obtained from other sources. In reports to the commander concerning the enemy, fact had to be clearly distinguished from conjecture.

During a combat situation, the field regulation recommended reports begin with the most important data and observe the following order: time at which the enemy was discovered; where; by whom; his strength and composition; reliability of the information and brief conclusions as to the enemy's condition, activities and probable intentions.[23]

The most important intelligence reports were immediately submitted word for word. Information about the appearance of fresh German units, their disappearance from places in which they had or were supposed to have been, and any radical change in enemy activities were reported to the commander and the chief of staff. Such reports were immediately passed to higher headquarters and communicated to subordinate and adjacent units.

In addition to working maps, the intelligence section produced order of battle charts. When a new enemy unit appeared on the front, the intelligence section organized a systematic study of its condition, assessing strengths and capabilities. Corps and division levels kept a field chart on which intelligence sections entered all information on the battle composition of enemy troops.

In the offensive approach march, the intelligence section had a set of concerns that required a continuous intelligence collection effort of all sources during the period of the approach. Collection requirements sought to determine with greater accuracy the organization of the defense zone, German unit disposition and system of defensive fortifications.

Time for the preparation of photo-diagrams and for the compilation of data provided by all the collection means was limited. In addition to the main and outer defense zones of the enemy, the intelligence section attempted to develop photo-diagrams on the second (rear) enemy defense line.

Approaching the German defensive zone, intelligence sections worked to elaborate and amplify the collection plan on the enemy's main defense zone and its obstacles. A system for methodical ground observation during the period of combat of the forward detachments was organized. When the security zone had been overrun and the forward detachments arrived near the enemy's combat outposts, divisional headquarters organized the destruction of these outposts and reconnaissance of the defense zone.

During this period, the main task of all headquarters was the direction of troop reconnaissance and the direct execution of this reconnaissance by staff officers and the chiefs of special army branches. The work of intelli-

gence was paramount at this stage. It concentrated all its collection efforts on determining the enemy defense system on the forward edge and in depth. In January 1945, Sobolev was called to lead the tank army's reconnaissance on the approaches to Poznan. He conducted a deep reconnaissance to determine the obstacles and barriers of the town's fortifications. The reconnaissance unit under his command captured the German deputy commander as well as maps of the area.[24]

As the forward detachments engaged the enemy, intelligence organized direct observation of the battlefield along the entire front of the division. The entire zone of advance of the divisions was divided into observational sectors. In accordance with the gradual progress of the advanced guards, the observers proceeded from one observation post to another, in order that they fully observed the forward edge and, if possible, the depth of the enemy disposition.

The observation system of artillery chiefs and their command posts had to be organized with particular thoroughness. At the same time as reconnaissance of the forward edge was conducted in battle, the observation, reconnaissance and photography of the enemy defense zone continued from the air. The chief of intelligence took all measures to deliver timely information to the commander.

The *Red Army Staff Field Service Regulation* identified actions for the chief of intelligence and the intelligence section in all aspects of combat. In addition to the guidance for offensive battle, it identified actions on the march, in meeting engagements, in defense, in mountain warfare, while crossing water obstacles, in fortified areas and in winter conditions. Intelligence had become an integral part of all aspects of warfare.

In the context of their past experiences, modern Soviet battlefield intelligence can be expected to continue to strive for those principles evidenced in the actions of Sobolev — reliability, continuity of effort, aggressiveness, timeliness and focused collection.

Forecasting the impact of technology on the future battlefield, the Soviets believe the acquisition and processing of intelligence will be an increasingly vital dimension of combat. New technologies have increased the range of collection, diversity of information and, consequently, the quality of intelligence on the battlefield. The intelligence staff position plays a key role in what the Soviets call "the struggle for information."

This struggle for information is the proliferation of the collection systems to acquire the information and link that acquisition to firing systems for quick responses, such as reconnaissance fire to strike complexes. The other half of the struggle is denying accurate information being gathered by the enemy on friendly forces.

In the struggle for information on the future battlefield, we must not underestimate the capabilities of chiefs of intelligence to accurately assess our actions and capabilities. We must be strong advocates for deception and operations security to deny their intelligence collectors information necessary for their quantitative analysis in decision making. We must work with the operational goal of directing the enemy towards friendly plans and intentions. Winning this struggle means affecting the enemy's command and control through his intelligence system — we must beat the Red "Two."

Footnotes

1. N.K. Popel, **Tanki povernuli na zapad** (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960), p. 108.
2. The Soviet term *razvedka* translates both as reconnaissance and intelligence. The term includes the U.S. Army concepts of reconnaissance, battlefield surveillance, target acquisition, collection management, analysis, production and dissemination.
3. **Sbornik materialov po izucheniyu opyta voiny. No 2.** (hereafter **Sbornik** #2) September-October 1942, General Staff of the Red Army (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1943), p. 47.
4. Ibid.
5. *Red Army Field Service Regulations*, 1942, (hereafter FSR 42), translated under the direction of the Chief of General Staff, Canada, July 1944, para. 30.
6. Ibid, para. 51.
7. ***Handbook of Soviet Armed Forces Military Symbols,*** Defense Intelligence Agency, DDB-2680-41-78, August 1978, pp. 3-4.
8. FSR 42, para. 166.
9. D.A. Dragunskii, **Gody v brone** (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975), p. 87.
10. FSR 42, para. 167.
11. Ibid.
12. M. E. Katukov, **No ostrie glavnogo udara** (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), p. 273.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. FSR 42, para. 191.
16. **Sbornik** #2, p. 49.
17. FSR 42, para. 192.
18. Ibid, para. 194.
19. Ibid, para. 199; M. A. Voloshin, **Razvedchiki vsegda vperedi** (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977), p. 17.
20. **Sbornik** #2, p. 54.
21. Voloshin, p. 18.
22. FSR 42, para. 200.
23. Ibid, paras. 201-203.
24. Katukov, pp. 357-358.

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We erroneously failed to credit Soldier of Fortune Magazine for the photograph used on page 14 of the October 1988 issue of Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin. The staff apologizes for this oversight.

the army intelligence master plan: a path to the 21th century

by Major Donald R. Cook

Greatly concerned by the disjointed and undefendable method through which intelligence and electronic warfare and target acquisition (IEW/TA) was being developed in the Army, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT), Department of the Army (DA), directed in early 1986, an examination to establish where we were, document where we were going and determine the best way to get there. Early analysis revealed three unconnected budget processes by which intelligence programs were built totally void of any relationship to each other. They included the Concept Based Requirement System used by TRADOC primarily for systems and force development at theater and below for the tactical Army; the National Foreign Intelligence Program used by national agencies for strategic intelligence development; and special access programs sponsored by various agencies and DA staff elements impacting on both tactical and strategic systems and force development. In short, there was no coherent plan for IEW/TA force development and no clear objective to provide a vector to the future.

In September 1986, under the tri-sponsorship of the Commander, TRADOC, the DCSINT and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, DA, the first iteration of the Army Intelligence Master Plan (AIMP) began. Two task forces were created to develop a single, overarching investment strategy for IEW/TA force development consisting of four major elements:

*A database capturing the current IEW/TA baseline.

*A future architecture describing projected organizations and equipment to meet the combat needs of the early 21st century.

*A peacetime objective architecture describing required capabilities for peacetime operations.

*A road map or action plan delineating the actions required to transition Army IEW/TA from the present through the year 2004.

The Fort Huachuca Task Force was charged to develop the concept for the future architecture under the direction of the Combined Arms Combat Development Activity. Represented were elements from the Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery and the Signal Schools, as well as the Intelligence and Security Command and the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS). The second task force operating at DA was responsible for developing the current data base with emphasis on systems, organizations, communications and current theater architecture, and to evaluate the peacetime objective. In May 1987, the two task forces consolidated their efforts toward creating the road map to the year 2004.

By August 1987, the first iteration of the AIMP was completed. Annual updates will accommodate changes in resourcing levels, the threat and available technology as well as Quick Reaction Capability requirements that are consistent with the thrust of the AIMP. Updates to the future architecture will incorporate the IEW Mission Area Concept (MAC), with the Mission Area Analysis (MAA) being the analytical basis. As MAC studies describe capabilities required on the future battlefield within the IEW mission area, the IEW MAA will provide deficiencies and crosswalk them to solution sets to meet those requirements. Solution sets will subsequently be addressed in the Mission Area Development Plan for use in projecting IEW force modernization criteria in the AIMP. The AIMP will thereby be continually updated to integrate appropriate IEW systems and force development to meet the battlefield requirements of the 21st century.



Figure 1

The AIMP is the vehicle which articulates Army IEW requirements and provides a single, coherent investment strategy that documents the evolution of tactical and strategic IEW/TA systems and force structure to meet the battlefield requirements of AirLand Battle-Future (ALB-F) and the year 2004. Recognizing the need to anticipate change and to plan accordingly, USAICS combat and training developers are institutionalizing the AIMP through the development of systems and training strategies for those systems. Systems emerging between now and 2004, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), Guardrail Common Sensor, Advanced Special Electronic Mission Aircraft (A-SEMA), Common Ground Station (CGS), the Family of Common Sensors (FCS), and the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) will provide the commander with required targeting intelligence for ALB-F. Along with other systems, they will evolve within the constraints of programmatic and force structure resources, allowing for the replacement of old systems by the new.

Success in ALB-F will require intelligence which provides commanders the ability to weigh critical targets in close operations while accurately pinpointing high payoff targets in deep operations. The UAV will provide deep targeting and collection capability into the corps commander's area of interest with limited risk while increasing accuracy for deep attack weapons and depth of coverage. The brigade commander, primarily concerned with close operations, will acquire the capability to see over the next hill through the Close UAV. The Close UAV will provide the brigade commander with near-real-time targeting data to reduce threat first-echelon capabilities while additionally providing him an ability to react to the main effort of the second echelon. In offensive deep maneuver scenarios, the Close UAV becomes the brigade commander's primary source of information for flank security and forward reconnaissance. Through the combined capabilities of the Joint Short Range and Close UAVs, commanders will acquire the abilities to see and target deep as well as close on the battlefield of ALB-F.

Today, the Army has an urgent need for a tactical, airborne, signals intelligence system which will intercept, exploit and accurately locate hostile communications, radar and other non-communications emitters. Guardrail Common Sensor will meet that need by replacing the older Guardrail V, Improved Guardrail V and the Quick-look II systems. Guardrail Common Sensor will consist of a readily deployable ground Integrated Processing Facility (IPF) and associated airborne sensors mounted on a modified RC-12 aircraft. The system will additionally include a Commander's Tactical Terminal collocated at the IPF and with designated tactical commanders for dissemination of time-sensitive combat information. Guardrail Common Sensor will serve as the corps commander's primary target acquisition system for deep operations and will be used to cue other intelligence assets.

Even prior to the fielding of Guardrail Common Sensor, requirements documentation has been prepared for a follow-on system, the A-SEMA. The A-SEMA will meet the aerial exploitation requirements of the high intensity conflicts envisioned by ALB-F as well as low intensity scenarios in the 2004 time frame. A-SEMA will be a survivable, multi-mission, airborne platform capable of responding to division, corps and, where there is no division or corps, echelons above corps (EAC) commanders' intelligence requirements over the broad spectrum of potential threats. These threats dictate a platform with advanced aircraft survivability characteristics as well as growth potential. The platform must

carry a variety of mission payloads providing division, corps and EAC commanders with the most accurate reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition support ranging from signals intelligence to electro-optics to moving target indicators.

Toward the mid-1990s and into 2004, technology will allow us to replace current line of sight limited ground-based sensors. The multisensor, ground-based common sensor will be able to provide stand off for survivability and direction finding with limited emitter mapping. It will also provide an integrated system with links to the CGS and then to ASAS, Maneuver Control System and Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Distribution System for target and situation development in support of the division commander's close operations.

As air and ground sensors evolve toward the 21st century, the Directorate of Combat Developments, USAICS, is working with the Combined Arms Center in the fielding of a family of common sensors. This will incorporate modular components and common sensors, regardless of platform, to enhance interoperability between multi-mission area sensors (cueing, tasking and target verification) and to reduce the training and maintenance burden on commanders. The concept additionally provides the benefit of linking IEW sensors to the CGS for dissemination of time sensitive combat information to users and limiting preprocessing of information for analysis in the ASAS.

With the evolution of a wide variety of sensors and their subsequent fielding, a natural dependency could develop on single sensor downlinks, if not closely watched. Each unique link could subsequently represent a single point of failure denying critical information to the commander. Avoiding that single point of failure and ensuring the availability of intelligence to the combat user from the entire spectrum of operating sensors will be the primary mission of the CGS. A series of mission tailored, modular CGSs located with the designated maneuver commanders, fire support elements or tactical operations centers will receive the collected transmissions of all operating sensors and provide the information required by the commander or fire support element. The CGS will simultaneously provide the same information to the ASAS for further analysis and fusion to create the battlefield intelligence picture.

The ASAS will fuse the vast amount of combat information and provide it to the division, corps and EAC commanders as processed intelligence. It is the automated processor of large volumes of data providing IEW/TA support in a dynamic battlefield environment. It will receive, evaluate, correlate, file, display, process, analyze and report information from all sources and pro-



Figure 2

duce a fused, all-source intelligence picture of the battlefield.

In order to field evolutionary systems within manpower constraints, the Directorate of Combat Developments, USAICS, has developed a billpayer methodology which applies the AIMP investment strategy in terms of personnel and force structure. Simply stated, for every system fielded into the active Army, another may be removed. Through force integration, personnel requirements for new high tech systems can be met by retraining soldiers as old systems are taken out of the field. The resulting progress in force modernization may require occasional changes in Military Occupational Specialty criteria and may even create totally new specialties, but there will be no increase in the required numbers of soldiers.

As technology advances in support of the active Army in preparation for ALB-F, Reserve Components must be comparably modernized. Battlefield units of the Reserve Component will require the same systems interface, training and confidence as Active Components in order to provide division, corps and theater commanders with the IEW/TA required to fight and win. The AIMP provides a coherent plan ensuring force modernization and force integration of MI Reserve Component and augmented Active Component units as they transition to 2004. One innovative approach is to maintain selected systems in the Active Component with cadre personnel in peacetime while providing the capability to rapidly fill out those units with plug-in Reserve Component MI soldiers, teams or complete units upon mobilization. These reserve soldiers are assigned to a Reserve Component unit whose manning document is derived from and complements that of the gaining Active Component's Modified Table of Organization and Equipment. They train with their Active Component gaining unit and are assigned by name to specific positions, enhancing the ability to rapidly transition to war.

Through the AIMP and related IEW Modernization Plan, the intelligence community will have a clear road map to the future. USAICS is committed to incorporating into that road map high tech research and development in order to pull smart technology into requirements early, before moving on to design. This will result in fielding the best technology within force structure constraints in the earliest time, given budget affordability.

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INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD A PREDICTIVE INT

D
ELLIGENCE

by Major Russell H. Thaden

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) plays an important role in providing a tool to help identify feasible enemy courses of action and gaining an appreciation for the terrain on which we will fight. However, IPB does not provide the basis to identify which enemy course of action is most probable or to forecast enemy intentions. Relying on IPB to attempt this task puts the commander in grave risk of suffering the effects of enemy surprise. Current and emerging tactical doctrine gives the clear expectation that the intelligence system should predict enemy actions. For instance, Field Circular 100-15, *Corps Operations*, states that the G2 provides insight into probable enemy actions based on IPB and analyzes and develops targets based on commander's guidance.[1] Division and brigade level doctrine strengthens this point even further when it describes how IPB provides "a comparative data base of enemy capabilities and courses of action which, in turn, forms the basis for predicting intentions."[2] A recent briefing by students of the war colleges on a proposed future structure for the Army makes it clear that the doctrinal call for predictive intelligence is likely to continue into the future.[3]

Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, does not seem to be as specific or strong in calling for predictive intelligence. It describes IPB as a "comprehensive analysis of the effects of enemy capabilities, terrain and weather on operations."[4] It makes no mention of IPB providing predictions of enemy intentions or most probable courses of actions. In describing campaign planning, it does state that, among other things, "reasonable assumptions about enemy intentions and capabilities...form the starting point of campaign planning."[5] However this seems to be the only major doctrinal publication that does not call on IPB to provide predictive intelligence.

The instruction given in Army service schools clearly supports the current doctrinal manuals' call for predictive intelligence. In describing the IPB process, the Command and General Staff College reference on the commander's estimate states that IPB concentrates on building a data base prior to hostilities and highlights applicable data in support of tactical operations. This results in an intelligence estimate and an analysis of the battlefield area which show probable enemy courses of actions and intentions.[6]

A number of recent journal articles, some by senior commanders, emphasize even more strongly the desire for predictive intelligence. General Otis clearly expects IPB to achieve its doctrinal claim of providing probable enemy courses of action.[7]

It is not just the combat arms commanders who call upon the MI community to predict what the enemy will do. Current thought within MI shares the same feeling that we should predict enemy intentions. A recent publication on tactical intelligence analysis states that as an analyst, "Your job is difficult because you must predict what the enemy will do. Your means of using what you know to predict the enemy is to develop a conceptual threat model."[8]

It does not matter whether the intelligence product is called a most probable course of action, enemy intentions or predictive intelligence. What seems clear is that there is an expectation that IPB will provide the basis to tell what the enemy will do before he does it. This is seen as being necessary in order to support tactical planning prior to the battle.

These predictions are not the same thing as early recognition and warning of an enemy course of action that is already underway. The tactical planning with which this article is concerned takes place prior to operations or during a pause in the operations as friendly forces prepare for or assume the defense. The enemy is simultaneously preparing his attack plans. In this situation, IPB is being charged to predict the enemy's most probable course of action before he has committed himself. Based largely on the results of IPB, the friendly forces prepare their plans. As the enemy begins his operation, situation development will track his forces to confirm or refute the friendly expectations. As critical as it is to battlefield success, it is clear that situation development comes after whatever predictions may be derived from the IPB process. Having established the requirement placed on IPB, the next step to understanding IPB's ability to support predictive intelligence is to examine the doctrine.

IPB Doctrine

IPB is a systematic method of analyzing the enemy, terrain and weather to prepare for and conduct combat operations. Current Army intelligence doctrine states that IPB "clearly portrays what enemy forces can and cannot do on the battlefield and the probability of the adoption of a specific course of action."[9]

IPB is a five part process that consists of evaluation of the battlefield area, terrain analysis, weather analy-

sis, threat evaluation and threat integration. Prior to recent changes in doctrine, threat evaluation was the first step in IPB. Evaluation of the battlefield area was called evaluation of the area of operations. These changes are more in the vein of refinements and do not change the central purpose or thrust of IPB. The actual sequence of steps is not crucial as IPB is a continuous process.

Battlefield evaluation assesses the overall nature of the enemy and the environment. It helps determine what information will be needed and determines the area of operations and area of interest. During this first step the analyst gathers the maps, templating material, weather data and special terrain products needed.

Terrain and weather analysis will be looked at together because they are so closely related. Within the purpose of evaluating the ability of IPB to forecast the most probable enemy course of action, the initial terrain plays a key role. The analyst must determine where enemy and friendly forces can and cannot move and how the terrain affects this movement. The effect of weather on trafficability is also a primary consideration.

The outcome of terrain analysis includes a combined obstacles overlay. The influence of obstacles on mobility makes them one of the most important considerations in terrain analysis. By the process of eliminating unsuitable terrain, the analyst establishes which avenues of approach exist within the area. Avenues of approach and mobility corridors are essential to the IPB process. They delineate the area in which enemy activity should occur.

The combined obstacle overlay doctrinally incorporates average weather. Variations of the basic overlay that reflect normal seasonal weather variations should be prepared. More than one commander has suffered major reverses because of unseasonable weather. Easily traversable terrain can rapidly become impassable or the reverse can happen with equal speed.

Although this initial terrain and weather analysis only describes areas where enemy activity should occur, the whole tenor of IPB is that it will determine the most probable enemy course of action based largely on an analysis of the terrain and enemy doctrine. The analyst is advised to select the avenues of approach that best support the capabilities to move, shoot and communicate. Although this analysis is not specifically intended to determine which avenue of approach the enemy will choose, the clear thought is that the enemy is more likely to choose an avenue that provides fewer obstacles and better mobility. This is a strengthening of an assertion that while movement through these areas is not totally impossible, minimum doctrinal rates of speed through these areas could not be met. This carries the clear implication that terrain mobility is central to the enemy decision.

Threat evaluation consists of a detailed study of enemy forces, their composition and organization, tactical doctrine, weapons and equipment, and supporting battlefield functional systems. Threat evaluation determines enemy capabilities and how they operate relative to doctrine and training.

The threat evaluation process has three steps. First, a detailed data base of threat information is developed. Then threat capabilities are identified and evaluated. To focus the process, these capabilities are evaluated as they relate to our mission and the battlefield area. Finally a file of doctrinal templates that show how the enemy would theoretically and ideally like to conduct his operations is developed. Since it is not possible to template every conceivable enemy capability, the process discounts enemy capabilities that the analyst considers to be only remote possibilities.

The final step in the IPB process, threat integration, relates enemy doctrine to the terrain and weather to determine how the enemy might actually fight within the specific battlefield environment. Threat integration is sequentially accomplished through the development of situation, event and decision support templates.

The situation templates are modified doctrinal templates. They show how the enemy might deviate from his doctrine to deploy and fight on a specific piece of terrain. In developing these templates, the analyst does consider enemy attempts to achieve surprise. However, the primary considerations are the physical aspects of the terrain and weather which determine whether the enemy has the room to maneuver according to his doctrine.

Event templates are prepared from the situation templates. They show projected battlefield events and enemy activities which provide indicators of the enemy course of action. In conjunction with the event template, the analyst prepares an event analysis matrix which applies the time factor to the process. Before combat, the enemy analysis matrix and event template illustrate possible enemy courses of action as a basis for comparing friendly courses of action. During combat operations, it focuses on enemy probable courses of action.

The tendency to portray only those courses of action which seem most likely is reinforced strongly by service school instruction in which students are required to prepare only one event template for any given scenario. By doing so, the analyst virtually assumes away any enemy course of action that he does not template. The templates that are prepared will be invaluable in tracking the enemy if he adopts one of the templated courses of action. They may be less useful if the enemy adopts a course of action that the analyst did not foresee and template.

The last step in threat integration is the decision support template which is essentially the intelligence estimate in graphic form. It identifies critical events and threat activities relative to time and location which may require tactical decisions.[10] The decision support template still portrays all of the avenues of approach into the friendly area that the analyst found and prioritized during terrain analysis. The template shows decision points based on situation and event templates that show how the enemy *might* fight on this specific terrain. Yet at this point the intelligence analyst is required to project the most probable enemy course of action.

From the preceding discussion, it is apparent that the basic data that IPB focuses on is the terrain, weather, enemy doctrine and the enemy order of battle. A graphic intelligence estimate is then prepared from this data. It is used to support tactical planning by providing the most probable enemy course of action. Before examining some historical cases, it may be useful to examine some of the underlying assumptions that are normally made during the IPB process.

The first major assumption is that the enemy commander will closely follow his own doctrine. Major George A. Gaun made this very explicit when he wrote in the summer 1976 issue of

Military Intelligence, "We know that by doctrine the enemy is committed to predictable patterns of behavior."[11] Not only does this assume that the enemy doctrine is structured enough to provide a basis for prediction, it also assumes that we thoroughly understand the doctrine. While historical observation of Soviet-style forces suggests that this may be true for their forces, it may be an invalid assumption with regard to unexpected conflicts with other potential enemies. Even against a Soviet force, the personality and experience of the specific commander can be a more important determinant of actual enemy behavior than the general norms of doctrine. Finally, this assumption implicitly discounts the enemy's understanding of the principles of surprise.

In developing the doctrinal and situational templates, IPB depends heavily on the assumption that the enemy will commit the force that doctrinally will fit in the respective avenues of approach. When the analyst does not template the unlikely avenues, he assumes away the possibility that the enemy may chose to violate his norms and take the risk of higher than normal troop concentration on a specific avenue of approach.

The entire IPB process does not take into account the enemy commander's consideration of our own course of action in developing his plans. The threat templates are developed early to support friendly tactical planning. This tends to assume that terrain mobility considerations will be more important to the enemy than the disposition and strength of our forces. Because we have not decided on our own plan, IPB has no way to include it in the analysis. If possible, an attacker prefers to design his attack against a specific enemy disposition rather than to fight on what is theoretically the best avenue of approach.

All operational and tactical planning is governed by the objective it is designed to accomplish. To accomplish a valid IBP with regard to establishing probable enemy courses of action requires either actual knowledge of enemy operational objectives or assumptions about them. When conducting IPB as a part of peacetime contingency planning or before a major operation, specific knowledge of enemy objectives is quite likely to be sketchy. Speculative assumptions must be made in the absence of such concrete information. Whether these assumptions are made at the tactical headquarters performing its IPB or taken as given from a higher headquarters, their fundamental nature as assumptions and not facts remains the same.

The success or failure of IPB as a means to predict enemy actions is closely tied to the validity of these assumptions. Many of these assumptions tend not to be explicitly stated as a part of the IPB process. As a result, the commander may well make his tactical decision based on assumptions of which he is unaware. This tends to increase the risk he assumes. During actual tactical operations, the IPB products are the foundation of the situation development process which is intended to help the commander see the battlefield. If the IPB process is faulty in attempting to predict an enemy course of action without adequate evidence, situation development will be forced to react to enemy initiative and may not accomplish its tasks.

Historical Cases

Ardennes 1944: The Battle of the Bulge provides the opportunity to look at the intelligence preparation of a major American defensive operation against a modern, heavily mechanized force. Although the German offensive ultimately failed, it was a total surprise and temporarily took the initiative away from the Allies. It is thus a good case study through which to examine the utility of IPB techniques now in use and to see if techniques not in use in 1944 might have proved helpful in preventing the surprise.

Examining what was done at field army level provides a useful analog to the modern corps, because at that time the field army fused tactical intelligence with external intelligence provided by national agencies and the Air Force. The field army was the lowest level to receive the highly sensitive signals intelligence that ULTRA provided from decoded German high-level ciphers.[12]

By September 1944, the U.S. First Army attack in the west had slowed from the rapid pace of the summer. As the pace of the Allied advance slowed, Hitler began to plan a counteroffensive in the Ardennes with the objective of crossing the Meuse and taking Antwerp.[13]

Hitler chose the Ardennes for several reasons. The American defenses were known to be weak and he viewed the Ardennes as the seam between the American and British forces. Distance to the strategic objective of Antwerp was short. The limited maneuver room in the Ardennes made it possible to use fewer forces, and there was a good area for concealed concentration of forces in the Eifel just to the east. Finally, an attack in the Ardennes would relieve the threat to the strategically vital Ruhr industrial area.[14]

In Hitler's view, Germany had reached the culminating point of the defense which, as Clausewitz said, is the time "when the defender must make up his mind and act, when the advantages of waiting have been completely exhausted."[15] It was apparent that further defense and waiting would only increase the already disproportionate Allied advantages in strength and airpower. However slim the chances of success, they seemed to Hitler to be better than the certain defeat that would come through continued defensive operations. As will become apparent, the Allies almost completely assumed away the possibility that Hitler or his commanders would react this way.

The Ardennes was virtually the last place that First Army or its higher headquarters would have expected the Germans to launch a major offensive. The area is cut with deep gorges and steep valleys. There are a number of rivers that pose obstacles to military movement. The weather was harsh and the heavy precipitation of November and December made cross-country movement extremely difficult.[16]

Beyond the difficulties inherent in the terrain itself, the senior Allied commanders did not see any logical objectives that could be reached through the Ardennes. There were no facilities or terrain features of importance in the area and too few American units to be a logical target for a force-oriented attack.[17]

Although no IPB was conducted in modern terms, a terrain and weather analysis of the Ardennes in November 1944 would have shown extensive obstacles with inadequate avenues of approach for any major mechanized force. With no lucrative objectives in the vicinity, the analyst would have had difficulty in projecting offensive avenues of approach through the

area. If a major enemy offensive had been considered feasible, the avenues of approach through the Ardennes would not have seemed a logical choice for the enemy.

The Germans looked at the Ardennes from a different perspective. The experience of 1940 showed them that mechanized forces could move through the Ardennes rapidly when relatively unopposed. Hitler's hope was to strike weak American forces and rapidly overwhelm and penetrate their defenses. East of the Ardennes the Eifel was served by rail lines feeding in from Koblenz, Cologne and smaller bridges over the Rhine.[18]

An IPB analyst could have recognized the possibility that German forces could be concealed in the Eifel and would also have seen the excellent rail lines leading north and south out of the Eifel. This would have allowed the Germans to use forces in the Eifel against the First Army's main effort north of the Ardennes or the parallel operations of Patton's Third Army south of the Ardennes. As events transpired, the analysts at that time considered those courses of action to be more probable than an attack into the Ardennes itself. They felt that although the enemy had come through the Ardennes in 1870 and again in 1940, the terrain was not suited for mobile warfare, particularly in the winter months when bad weather was likely to make the poor road nets even less valuable than usual.[19]

By this point in the war, there can be no doubt that the Americans understood German tactical and operational doctrine. What is important to this case is the way the Americans expected the Germans to fight. This was colored by who they thought was in charge. Since Field Marshal von Rundstedt had returned to command in the west, he had worked what seemed a miracle in establishing a coherent defense along Germany's western frontier. As late as December, the First Army G2 expected Rundstedt to continue fighting in the same professional manner and, in a none too subtle reference to Hitler, noted that Rundstedt "obviously is conducting military operations without the benefit of intuition."[20]

While the First Army G2 understood Rundstedt's methods and doctrine, there was no doctrinal templating as such done by First Army. To speculate for a moment, what templates would they have logically prepared at the First Army Headquarters in November 1944? The major focus would necessarily be to template the various kinds of defensive postures that the Germans could be expected to assume. This would include templates of strong forward defenses with limited counterattack forces and templates of a deeper defense with strong counterattack forces. Templates of German offensive action could have been prepared, but would presumably have had a lower priority. There was no reason and insufficient evidence to support the idea that a major German attack was in preparation.

Doctrinal templates should be prepared based not only on general enemy doctrine but based on specifics that apply to the situation. In this case, it is apparent that relying on such an approach would have been very misleading. Americans understood Rundstedt's fighting doctrine and believed he was in control. On that basis they expected the Germans to conduct a conservative defense and attempt to preserve their forces as long as possible. What they did not understand was that Hitler effectively took control and planned the operation.[21] Hitler had his own doctrine.

If terrain and weather analysis would not have pointed specifically to the Ardennes as the most probable scene of a major German counteroffensive, threat integration would have pointed to *almost any place except the Ardennes*. The first step in threat integration brings together the terrain analysis showing avenues of approach with the doctrinal templates showing how the enemy would like to fight. Without any good avenues of approach into the Ardennes it is difficult to see how the analysts of 1944 could have generated plausible situation templates of a German attack. Without such situation templates, there could be no event or decision support templates for that eventuality.

A problem that complicates any intelligence effort is enemy deception. In this case the Germans had a two-part cover and deception plan. First was a relatively obvious concentration of forces east of Aachen in the Cologne area. Second was a well-concealed movement of forces into the Eifel opposite the Ardennes. As late as possible, they shifted the northern forces to the south as part of the main effort. Since the Germans could not totally conceal the presence of some forces in the Eifel, the cover story portrayed that a secondary and relatively small force of burned-out divisions was being gathered in the Eifel to contain the right flank of the expected Allied penetration.[22]

The Battle of the Bulge is not just a good case study through which to examine the potential of IPB to predict enemy courses of action. It is also a good case to see the dynamic relationship between IPB and situation development. These events make it clear how current situation development can be skewed dangerously by an incorrect appraisal of enemy intentions. Although there was substantial evidence of unusual German activity, it was misinterpreted and the Allies believed the German deception story.

There was evidence of Hitler's intentions as early as early September. He had told Japanese Ambassador Oshima that he planned to launch a major counteroffensive in the west sometime after the beginning of November. Because the United States was still able to decrypt Japanese diplomatic messages, this information was in the hands of American intelligence in Washington almost immediately.[23]

The Allies and First Army knew that the Germans had moved large numbers of aircraft to the west in November. The hasty transfers were needed to meet the original November attack date. When the attack was postponed the aircraft remained, but the Allies still had no idea why they were there. There was even clear evidence of repeated German reconnaissance of the Meuse crossing sites west of the Ardennes. Intelligence was plentiful and informative, but it did not point conclusively towards an offensive in the Ardennes.[24]

There are some important observations that help explain why the Americans were surprised and why IPB may not have been able to prevent that surprise. Lacking a specific breach of German security, the Americans had no direct knowledge of Hitler's intentions or new strategic objectives in the war. Even Hitler's senior commanders did not know his objectives until well into the planning process. An analysis of probable enemy courses of action based on a speculative and incorrect assumption of enemy strategic and operational objectives has a very weak foundation. Given the extreme security consciousness of many of our

potential enemies, it would be unreasonable to assume that we will know specific enemy strategic and operational objectives any better than First Army did in 1944.

As this case shows, the enemy is perfectly capable of choosing to use terrain that does not appear to favor his operations. It is a gamble because he must achieve quick success or failure will probably be total. Whether he succeeds or fails, in the end his chances of achieving surprise in such terrain are great. If the overall Allied superiority in 1944 had not been so totally overwhelming, the German offensive would have been even more dangerous than it seemed to be at the time. As it was, the surprise was so complete that the recriminations still reverberate more than 40 years later.

Manchurian Campaign

The Soviet campaign against the Japanese in Manchuria provides numerous examples of the ability of a mature Soviet army to generate an extremely rapid advance by specifically seeking routes through the most difficult terrain. In nine days the Soviet army advanced from 500 to 950 kilometers into Manchuria and forced the surrender of the Japanese and their auxiliaries.[25]

The Japanese had fought the Russians in this area in 1939. Based on this experience, they thought that it would be impossible to support an invading force of more than 50,000 men in Eastern Mongolia and 150,000 more in that part of Siberia adjacent to West Manchuria. In actuality, the Soviets ultimately were able to deploy more than 350,000 men into East Mongolia for the attack.[26]

Based on their own experience against the Russians and on reports from their German allies, the Japanese felt they had a good understanding of Soviet doctrine. They expected a fairly stereotyped, inflexible approach to tactics. What they got was a very flexible enemy who used maneuver extensively and displayed remarkable ability to adapt his doctrine to the situation and then to apply tactical flexibility and initiative on the battlefield.

The Japanese plans to defend the pass through the Grand Khingans from Halung-Arshaan to Solun provide a good case study. Because they believed it to be one of only two feasible routes of invasion, the Japanese made extensive preparations for strong defenses through the depth of this avenue of approach. The commander of the Soviet 39th Army took full advantage of the Japanese dispositions which made it apparent where the Soviet attack was expected. Rather than using the normal echelonment of forces, the commander planned to attack in one echelon with three rifle corps abreast. One corps was to attack to the north to support the adjacent 36th Army. The main attack was to consist of two rifle corps lead by a tank division and two tank brigades. This attack would bypass the Japanese and would cross the mountains to the south.

The 39th Army conducted a 120-kilometer approach march from 2 to 6 August which made it impossible for the Japanese to recognize the point of attack until too late. When the 39th Army attacked on 9 August, it was spectacularly successful. In spite of extreme difficulty with the terrain, heat injuries and much higher than expected fuel consumption, the 61st Tank Division advanced 100 kilometers the first day. Simultaneously, the 124th Rifle Division engaged and successfully tied up the Japanese forces defending the pass. By 12 August, the main attack had crossed the mountains and reached the flank and rear of the Japanese Division which was still being pressed by the 124th Rifle Division. By 15 August, the Soviets had defeated the Japanese division and were ready to continue their rapid advance into Manchuria.[27]

The 39th Army attack was only one of numerous examples in this campaign where the Soviets used terrain that theoretically should not have been able to sustain their doctrinal rates of advance. Like all commanders with limited resources, the Japanese commanders could not be strong everywhere. They concentrated their forces where it seemed likely that the enemy would most probably attack. Based on their knowledge of Soviet tactical doctrine, they expected a stereotyped attack along the good avenues of approach. What they got was an enemy who made audacious use of extremely difficult terrain and terrible weather conditions to bypass Japanese defenses and generate nearly unbelievable rates of advance.

Analysis

In each of the preceding cases the defender was surprised even though he had the equivalent of a good IPB available. There are several major factors that contributed to these failures which make any current claims to provide predictive intelligence based on IPB very suspect.

The IPB process relies heavily on the use of terrain analysis as a screen to assess the feasibility and, ultimately, the probability of an enemy course of action being adopted. The theory is that an enemy concerned with making a rapid advance will tend to choose terrain that will facilitate rather than hinder that advance. Liddell Hart makes a strong case that this is often not true and that a great commander will take even the most hazardous indirect approach — if necessary over mountains, deserts or swamps, with only a fraction of force, even cutting himself loose from his communications. Natural hazards, however formidable, are inherently less dangerous and less uncertain than fighting hazards. All conditions are more calculable, all obstacles more surmountable, than those of human resistance.[25]

It is very important to understand enemy tactical doctrine, but the evidence of these cases does not support using it as the primary tool to predict enemy courses of action. There are too many other variables that influence the enemy decision. The personality and style of the commander often have a greater influence on the course of action than the enemy doctrine. Yet, it is not always possible to know who is truly the commander of an operation. It is normal to evaluate the enemy one echelon above our own. However, in the case of the Battle of the Bulge the tactical defender would actually have had to look up several echelons all the way to the enemy national command level to assess enemy intentions.

Even if the tactical commander knows which enemy commander to consider, using doctrine as a predictive tool is not reliable. The Soviets, for all their reputation as being rigidly doctrinaire, have shown that skilled armies can and do flexibly adapt their doctrine to the circumstances. In fact, the Soviets have frequently and deliberately used enemy knowledge of their doctrine as a tool to deceive and surprise the enemy.

The defenders in the cases studied and current IPB doctrine fail to consid-

er adequately the dynamic relationship between enemy and friendly courses of action. An analysis that leads to a postulated most probable enemy course of action is normally used to decide upon friendly tactical plans. The flaw is that the attacking enemy has the initiative. He can and will modify his plans based on what he is able to learn about friendly forces. Even this response is not predictable, because it is seldom known with any degree of assurance what the enemy actually knows about our forces.

In addition to these factors, a problem that seems to be consistent in these cases and could certainly arise with IPB is the development of a false sense of confidence that we understand enemy intentions. As one author wrote 50 years ago regarding predicting intentions, "Any commander who is addicted to this process and who has arrived at a conclusion as to what he considers 'enemy probable intentions' will interpret all subsequent enemy information in such a way as to reinforce his preconceived ideas."[29] This problem is no less true today than it was then.

Conclusion

Clearly, IPB is an important step forward as a tool to provide a systematic way to analyze the enemy, terrain and weather before the battle. It is important as a tool to evaluate the impact of terrain and weather on both friendly and enemy capabilities. It should certainly facilitate identifying various enemy capabilities. Based on the terrain analysis, IPB can help assess which enemy capabilities may be easier or more difficult to execute.

On the other hand, while current doctrine clearly calls for it, IPB does not provide a reliable basis on which to predict enemy action before the fact. As important as the terrain and doctrine are to the enemy in planning his operations, they are only part of the equation. IPB provides no basis other than speculative assumption on which to identify enemy objectives. IPB does not have a mechanism to evaluate or incorporate what the enemy knows or believes to be true about our disposition, strength and intentions. These have at least as much bearing on the course of action the enemy chooses as the factors that IPB does consider.

The currently unstated assumptions made in the IPB process must be explicitly identified and analyzed for their validity and impact on the results. It will normally be an assumption that the enemy will seek to attack on the best avenues of approach. The preceding cases show how weak that assumption can be. The idea that any specific commander will apply normal doctrine is also an assumption. It is not possible to be certain that he has not changed procedures based on his experience or even been overruled by a superior, as was Rundstedt. Because enemy objectives are often tightly guarded, it will frequently be necessary to assume them. Yet, without knowing these objectives, it is impossible to predict specific enemy courses of action. Knowing what assumptions he is working from, the analyst has some prospect of identifying feasible courses of action. He must be wary of going any further without substantiating evidence.

Finally, IPB can greatly assist the commander to develop what Clausewitz, in discussing military genius, calls a "sense of locality." He points out that the importance of terrain is *"decisive in the highest degree,* (emphasis in original) for it affects the operations of all forces, and at times entirely alters them." He goes on to discuss how important it is to be able to have an accurate understanding of the topography of an area.[30] As the battlefield has become vastly more extended since Clausewitz' time, this sense of terrain has become much harder to achieve. To the degree that IPB helps a commander improve his understanding of how the terrain will affect him and the enemy, it will make a major contribution to his success.

Footnotes

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German Human Intelligence and the Conduct of "Operation CITADEL"

by Captain Justin L.C. Eldridge

In 1943, German human intelligence (HUMINT) played a limited role in providing the German operational commander with needed intelligence information.[1] Hitler's failure to appreciate HUMINT as an intelligence source, a lack of highly placed agents in the Soviet high command, poor interrogation techniques at the tactical and

operational level, and the Soviet soldier's lack of understanding of his own operations prevented HUMINT from contributing useful operational-level information. The problems may have been evident throughout the war. However, the July 1943 offensive against the Kursk salient, "Operation CITADEL," highlighted many of the problems German HUMINT faced.

There were a variety of German HUMINT organizations prior to 1943, but because the fragmentation led to unorganized and inefficient intelligence collection, the Germans reorganized HUMINT on the eastern front to ensure sources were maximized to the fullest extent. The most famous German intelligence organization of World War II was the *Amt/Ausland Abwehr*, more simply known as the *Abwehr*. It was primarily responsible to the German high command for counterintelligence but had some responsibility for human and foreign intelligence collection. The director of the *Abwehr* was Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, who was later arrested for his part in the plot to assassinate Hitler.[2]

The *Abwehr* had three branches that collected intelligence from a variety of sources on the eastern front. The first branch conducted espionage, the second conducted sabotage missions and the third performed counterintelligence. Each branch had liaison subelements for the Army, Navy and Air Force. The major limitation of the *Abwehr* intelligence apparatus was the lack of any analytical capability.[3]

To compensate for the *Abwehr's* lack of analysis, Colonel Reinhard Gehlen, the top intelligence officer at the German army high command (OKH), received permission from Canaris to integrate the first and third branches of the *Abwehr* into his organization. This arrangement allowed an *Abwehr* representative to pass information collected for analysis and collation into army and army group intelligence reports. These reports were distributed to the high command and subordinate combat elements on the eastern front. From army the reports were sent not only to the army group G2 but to a Major Brown, who in turn forwarded the information to Gehlen's staff. In this way Gehlen created two distinct intelligence reporting chains: one through the G2 at each echelon and one through the Abwehr, whose forward collection units passed their information to their own higher headquarters and then through a "cross over" to the G2 at army and army group.[4]

Gehlen organized his personal staff into three analytical sections. The first section (*Fuehreugsgruppe*) reported information from the army groups, air reconnaissance and radio monitoring, including all the other information from Major Brown and Abwehr's first branch. The second section (*Gesamtrussland*) concerned itself with long-term assessments and the third (*Dolmetschergruppe*) did most of the interrogation and document translation.

Below OKH were the army groups, where three officers and four enlisted men evaluated and prepared documents and financed foreign agents. The counterintelligence (CI) officer, usually a major, directed CI, antisabotage and political security, and the *Abwehr* collection units attached to the army group. His two CI assistants monitored the partisan situation map and handled all code, cipher and document losses in the command.

A major, assisted by a second lieutenant, managed army-level HUMINT. At their disposal were the *Abwehr* units in their area of operations, along with a 45-man *Wehrmacht* Secret Field Police force that investigated breaches of security and political and criminal activity.

A lieutenant ran the army interrogation section and administered and briefed subordinate interrogation teams. The amount of work determined the number of interrogators and interpreters the army received through the personnel system. The teams interrogated prisoners and evaluated captured documents.

For the most part, the division G2 depended on the interrogation reports to remain updated on the enemy situation. The division G2 also handled routine counterintelligence activities which included investigation of security violations, safeguarding classified material and indoctrination of new personnel on the safeguarding of military information.

The foreign intelligence and the *Abwehr* officers in the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* (OKW or German Armed Forces High Command) selected the CI officers for army and army group. These officers usually had a strong background in HUMINT and possessed a great deal of initiative.[5]

The Germans inappropriately depended on spy networks and HUMINT sources for much of their intelligence. They used a variety of human sources (prisoners of war (POW), line-crossers and specially trained *Abwehr* agents) to gather intelligence against the Soviet Union. Poor interrogation techniques hampered HUMINT at the tactical level while line-crossers and agents could not be depended upon for accurate information. These problems were especially severe because German ground reconnaissance could not penetrate the Soviet defensive positions, which restricted the German HUMINT effort to *Abwehr* agents and POW. In spite of these problems, Gehlen insisted the two most reliable intelligence sources were the *Abwehr* agents and captured POWs and documents.[6]

To obtain information from prisoners, the Germans established a comprehensive interrogation process, which began at company level, where the prisoner was relieved of papers, maps and overlays. Battalion or regiment interrogated prisoners only if they received permission from division because their interrogation reports were notoriously poor. Division usually conducted the first systematic prisoner interrogations.

The next significant POW processing point was at army level. Here, the first thorough examination of prisoners and documents was made. The prisoners were interrogated using production line techniques. The prisoners, placed in large groups, wrote their answers to specific questions the interrogators asked. The army translation section also examined captured documents and searched for operations maps that may have indicated a coming offensive.

Line-crossers and trained agents were recruited from the large numbers of Russian deserters and prisoners. Russian POWs or deserters who were chosen to act as line-crossers and agents were trained for three to six weeks, depending on the mission.[7]

The Germans used a great deal of care when they recruited Russians and discovered that ideals influenced the Russians more than "...avarice in the undertaking of dangerous missions." The Abwehr handled most line-crossers or agents who worked for an army or army group headquarters. A division G2 could also request line-crossers for specific missions in his area of operations.[8]

Hitler's lack of support for the taking of prisoners became a problem as the war dragged on. In 1943, just before "CITADEL," reports reached Hitler that the Soviets were executing SS prisoners. In retaliation, Hitler ordered that "no prisoners" would be taken during "CITADEL." This order, if carried out, would have eliminated prisoners as an intelligence source. One of the reasons Soviet prisoners found it easy to talk to the Germans was Stalin's order that they were to be treated as traitors if captured unhurt.9 Albert Speer, the Minister of Armaments, was convinced the order was a mistake and persuaded Hitler to withdraw the directive, even though its systematic enforcement at lower echelons may have been doubtful. With German military setbacks, the number of prisoners decreased along with the value of information they provided.10

Another problem was the lack of quality German agents in the Soviet high command. Gehlen has stated that German agents were in the Soviet high command structure and provided information prior to "CITADEL." However, some historians have argued that Gehlen did not have agents in the Soviet High Command and therefore the Germans did not have any inroads into Soviet strategy immediately before Kursk. More likely, the German agents in the Soviet high command, like the German interrogators, did not adequately understand the needs of the German combat commanders.11

A final, recurring problem was the poor quality of interrogators at the tactical and operational level. Division interrogation was especially inadequate. The division interrogators' ability was limited because of insufficient training in military topics.12

"Operation CITADEL" was the German's last major offensive on the eastern front. They hoped to destroy the Soviet reserves located in the huge Kursk bulge. The results of many of the prisoner interrogations during "CITADEL" cast doubt on the utility of HUMINT as a viable intelligence source at the operations level of war. Soviet prisoner statements at Kursk were, on the whole, contradictory and few prisoners knew of the date of the planned Soviet counteroffensive. In fact, there were just as many POW statements concerning a Soviet "attack" as there were statements concerning a "defense," making a clear evaluation of Soviet intentions difficult. Gehlen learned that the Soviet POWs had been supplying information that incorrectly denigrated Russian military capabilities. The Germans estimated that only 20 percent of the information the line-crossers provided was of value. These statistics stood in sharp contrast to Gehlen's belief in HUMINT's contribution to the war effort.13

Despite poor training and a parochial concern with the division's area of operations, prisoner reports during "CITADEL" did give tactical commanders some tactical battlefield information. The 20th Panzer Division, 47th Panzer Corps, 9th Army captured a prisoner during the first few days of combat. The prisonur, from the 47th Rifle Regiment, 15th Rifle Division, told his interrogators about a Soviet weakness near the hamlet of Bobrik. The division commander focused his attack in this area and successfully exploited the information.14

The fluid battlefield situation made HUMINT inappropriate for operational use. Though Gehlen may have preferred this source of intelligence, any operational intelligence from POW and HUMINT sources was of doubtful quality and did not play a decisive role at Kursk.

Footnotes

1. Tactical intelligence concerned Soviet corps and below operations. Operational level intelligence concerned Soviet army and front operations, while strategic intelligence concerned operations above the front level.
2. The strategic aspect of the Abwehr is not in the scope of this paper. For more information on Admiral Canaris and the Abwehr, see: Hans Bernd Gisevius, **To the Bitter End,** trans. Richard and Clara Winston (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947); Ian Covin, **Admiral Canaris: Chief of Intelligence** (London: Gollancz, Ltd, 1951); Harold C. Deutsch, **The Conspiracy Against Hitler in the Twilight War** (Minneapolis: The Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1968); Lauran Paine, **German Military Intelligence in World War II** (New York: Stein and Day, 1984); Harry G. Sheen, "The Disintegration of the German Intelligence Service," ***Military Review*** 29, June 1949, pp. 38-41; Paul Leverkuehn, **German Military Intelligence**, trans. R.H. Stevens and Constantine Fitzgibbon (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954).
3. Reinhard Gehlen, **The Service** (New York: Popular Library, 1971), pp. 41-43. Though General Gehlen was an intelligence officer, he was not part of the Abwehr. Gehlen worked for the *Oberkommando des Herres* (OKH or High Command of the Army). This should not be confused with the OKW, the High Command of the Armed Forces for which Canaris worked. The OKH's primary responsibility in 1943 was the war against Russia.
4. Gehlen, pp. 41-45; E. H. Cookridge, **Gehlen: Spy of the Century** (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 79.
5. **German Operational Intelligence: A Study of German Operational Intelligence** (Washington, D.C.: Military Intelligence Division, War Department, April 1946); "The German G-2 Service in the Russian Campaign," **German Military Intelligence, 1939-1945**, ed. Thomas F. Troy, (Frederick, Md., University Publications of America, 1984), pp. 22, 52-94.
6. Gehlen, p. 64; David Kahn, **Hitler's Spies** (New York: Macmillan, 1976), p. 210; Michael Handel, "Introduction: Strategy and Operational Deception in Historical Perspective," ***Journal of Strategic Studies*** 3 (1984), p. 36.
7. **German Operational Intelligence**, pp. 3-6, 49-51, 63-78, 134-135; Gehlen, p. 68.
8. Cookridge, p. 83; **German Operational Intelligence**, pp. 49-51, 63.
9. Troy, pp. 42-43.
10. **German Operational Intelligence**, p. 3; Albert Speer, **Inside the Third Reich**, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Macmillan-Collier Books, 1970, 1981), p. 268.
11. Gehlen, pp. 66-67; Martin Caldin, **The Tigers are Burning** (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1974), p. 66.
12. **German Operational Intelligence**, pp. 60-62; Troy, pp. 10, 89.
13. Washington D.C., National Archives, German Document Collection, T-314/986/000691-92, *"Tatigkeitsbericht fur die Zeit vom 24.3. bis 15.8. 1943."*; T-78/478/6461802-6461803, *"Verschloierung der sowj. Lage und Planc durch aftragagemas-falsche Agentenaussagen?"*; Troy, p. 8-9. Exactly how the Germans would know of Soviet attempts at deception was unclear, considering the Soviet habit of keeping their soldiers barely informed of their own operations.
14. Paul Carrell, Scorched Earth: **The Russian-German War, 1943-1944**, trans. by Ewald Osers (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1964), p. 38.

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GENETRIX--
The Intelligence Balloon

by Dino A. Brugioni

Balloons were used for reconnaissance purposes as far back as 1794 when the French used balloons to observe movement of Austrian troops during the Battle of Fleurus. Balloons were also used during the Civil War and World War I, but it wasn't until the post-World War II period that a serious program was initiated to use balloons as platforms for a wide variety of sensors designed to look down at the earth's surface and upward at the stars.

The advances in chemistry, especially in plastics, during World War II provided a superior-quality lightweight polyethylene material and a thin mylar which, when laminated with reinforcing scrim or mesh of dacron thread, provided strong lightweight materials for constructing balloons. These plastics were capable of withstanding the rigorous conditions of upper atmosphere environments. The polyethylene balloon was lighter and cheaper and, when filled with helium or hydrogen, could carry a heavier payload.

The Office of Naval Research began using some of the polyethylene materials in Project Skyhook, a program designed to gather information for upper air research and future space flights. The first flight of a Skyhook balloon in 1947 carried a payload of 63 pounds to an altitude of 30 kilometers. The Navy continued to launch even larger balloons, including some launched from ships at sea.

Dr. Edwin H. Land, a photoscientist, repeatedly prodded the U.S. Air Force to evaluate radical reconnaissance suggestions. It was Land more than anyone else who became the principal advocate of new reconnaissance methodology. In early 1950, the Rand Corporation, viewing the spectacular results of the Navy Skyhook program and realizing that balloons provided stable platforms from which aerial photographs could be taken, proposed to the U.S. Air Force a project on the feasibility of using large balloons for photo reconnaissance. The study was referred to the Air Force Scientific Board who called for further research by Rand and the preparation of a more detailed concept of the balloon camera system, the costs and the potential intelligence benefits to be had from such a system. The Air Force was floating hundreds of large polyethylene balloons with scientific instruments for a variety of purposes.

In February 1953, Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell became Deputy Director of the CIA. Shortly after he took office, he was briefed on the Air Force project prepared by Rand, now codenamed "Moby Dick." Cabell met with the Director of Air Force Intelligence who proposed that the project be implemented for photographic penetration of the Soviet Union. The Air Force referred to the project as Weapon System 119L and later gave the project the code name "GENETRIX."

The GENETRIX balloon was the so-called zero pressure type which rose to the height of the jet stream where it ballooned, attained buoyant equilibrium and floated in the prevailing westerly air stream of the upper atmosphere. To maintain equilibrium, the balloon was designed to either vent excess gas or intermittently release ballast. The balloons, up to 60 feet in diameter when filled, were fueled with hydrogen gas and were capable of lifting a payload of about 1,500 pounds. The payload consisted of a camera, film, parachute and recovery devices, a battery, command and control instrumentation, ballast and rigging. The camera had a 6-inch focal length, with sufficient film to acquire about 500 photographs.The balloons floated at altitudes of 40 to 60 thousand feet and traveled at speeds varying from 75 to 125 kilometers per hour. A light sensing device activated the cameras at daylight and turned them off at dark. Usually during the fourth or fifth day of flight when a balloon reached the Pacific Ocean, its transmitter would begin emitting a distinctive signal. The flight of the balloon would be ended by a signal sent from a transmitter aboard an aircraft. Upon command, detonation charges would automatically explode the balloon and the camera and film would be parachuted to earth. If the parachute was not retrieved by an aircraft and it fell into the ocean, the camera package would float and an emergency battery-operated transmitter would be activated by the effect of salt water. The transmitter would continue to send out signals until the package was recovered.

To forestall any claim that the balloons were a hazard to aircraft inflight, they were equipped with an aneroid barometer which would destroy the balloon if it failed to rise above 30,000 feet within 35 minutes of launch. If the balloons leaked gases or dropped to 30,000 feet, they would also be destroyed automatically. During darkness, the balloons flashed standard red aircraft warning lights. There were also contingency plans to explain the safety measures to Moscow if the Soviets demanded it.

Cabell realized that there were more than technical problems involved in implementing such a project. There would have to be White House approval. The planners did not doubt that the balloons were vulnerable to stormy weather and turbulence and that some balloons would rupture, be shot down or otherwise fall into Soviet hands. There was little doubt that the Soviets would also protest intrusions by the balloons. The big question in Cabell's mind was whether President Eisenhower would approve such a project knowing the risks and the possible Soviet reaction.

Events in the Soviet Union would speed up the progress of the project. The United States detonated its first thermonuclear device in November 1952. Nine months later in August 1953, the Soviets exploded a thermonuclear device of their own. In late 1953, a U.S. military attache spotted a heavy jet-engined bomber at a test and development field outside of Moscow. Although his report was sketchy, there was no doubt in Washington that this aircraft represented a

strategic threat to the United States. It appeared to be a counterpart of the B-52 which, at the time, was in about the same stage of development. In May 1954, the Soviets flew the large jet bomber, later designated the Bison, in the Moscow Air Show. The Soviets now had a thermonuclear weapon and a capability to deliver that weapon to targets in the continental United States.

In Congress, there were debates about the U.S. and Soviet military capabilities. There was a great need for technical information on the Soviet bomber and nuclear programs and the only hope of getting such information rested with aerial reconnaissance. On August 27, 1954, Eisenhower established a special panel of experts, "To direct a study of the country's technological capabilities and meet some of its current problems." The problems outlined by the president were principally concerned with intelligence needs.

During the winter of 1954-55, the U.S. Air Force, in addition to domestic balloon test programs, was conducting experimental tests in England. A number of balloons carrying instruments and released over Europe successfully penetrated the Soviet Union. The successes of these experiments were of sufficient importance that Eisenhower was briefed on the GENETRIX project. After further tests were conducted, the President approved the project. The cover story finally agreed upon was that GENETRIX was a high altitude, world-girdling meteorological and survey project which was part of weather research and development. The balloons were to chart the relatively unknown jet stream. All nations would benefit from the research results of this program and the information gathered would be published freely. The Air Force also acknowledged that there were two cameras, one to read the instrument panel to record barometric pressure, time, altitude and other data, and the other camera to record cloud formation and weather-front phenomena. The recording equipment aboard was to keep track of the speed and direction of the jet stream.

There was a frantic effort to position the launch and recovery crews, and in mid-January 1956, the United States began to launch balloons from Turkey, Germany, Norway and Scotland. A total of 519 balloons were launched and only 47 recovered.

In February 1956, the Soviet Union protested the balloon invasion as "inadmissible" and accused the United States of going to the "brink of war." The "brink of war" was an obvious reference to statements made by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, that the United States had saved the peace by warning Communist nations that it would meet communist aggression head on and with superior force, including atomic weapons. Dulles had said that in Indonesia, Korea and the Formosa Strait, "we walked to the brink and we looked it in the face. We took strong actions."

The Soviets charged that the balloons were being released in West Germany and Turkey, that they carried aerial cameras and radio transmitters, and that they violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Soviet Union. They also charged that the balloons threatened the lives of passengers and crew members aboard Soviet aircraft.

During the same month, the Air Force announced that over 200 balloons had been launched from Scotland and denied that any were launched from West Germany or Turkey. The statement, however, was at variance with statements made by U.S. officers in West Germany that launching of the balloons would continue from that country. Later, the Air Force would state that 200 balloons had been launched from Scotland "and other places in Europe." When asked about the Soviet charges, Dulles explained that the recording equipment carried in the gondola of the balloon kept track of the speed and direction of the jet stream and recorded cloud formations below the balloon. He explained "it would be quite accidental if the camera picked up anything of significance on the ground."

When the Soviet protest note was shown to Eisenhower, he remarked with a grin, "If they don't want them, tell them to return them back to us. Better still, demand it." Eisenhower's remarks were reflected in the formal reply to the Soviets. The note read in part: "The Soviet Government has not returned the scientific property which rightfully belongs to the United States and which the Soviet Government has endeavored to convert to propaganda uses of its own. In reviewing its request for the return of the equipment in question, the United States Government states its willingness to return the Soviet equipment that has come into its possession....Any legitimate concern of the Soviet Government regarding the United States balloon operation has been satisfied by the United States Government's decision conveyed in the note of February 8, provisionally to suspend the release of balloons which could transit Soviet territory." Eisenhower considered the case closed.

The Soviets were taken aback by both the U.S. Air Force statements and the Eisenhower administration's reply. At a news conference in Moscow, the Soviets placed 40 balloons and the cameras and copies of the aerial photos on display for the press. A Soviet military expert, Colonel A. V. Tarantsov, explained how the equipment worked and carefully displayed a roll of film and the photos taken of a mountain range. Instructions on the camera package in English, French, Japanese, Arabic and Urdu read as follows: "This box comes from the sky. It is harmless. It has weather information in it. Notify the authorities. You will receive a valuable reward when you turn it in as it is."

Along with the Soviet Union, the Albanian, Czechoslovakian, Hungarian and Romanian governments formally protested the balloon intrusions to the United Nations but did not request any formal actions. The Chinese also protested the balloon intrusions and placed balloons on display in Beijing.

Eisenhower minimized the entire balloon incident, stating his intention to go on exchanging personal letters with Nikolai Bulganin in efforts to improve East-West relations.

There is a postscript to this story. Whether by accident or design, the camera lifting apparatus consisted of a steel bar whose length and width stimulated an enhanced radar return from the then newly deployed Soviet TOKEN early warning radars. Soviet tracking of the balloons along its border was excellent, but deep inside the motherland the tracking left much to be desired. Thus, knowledge of Soviet tracking capabilities of high altitude vehicles proved invaluable in planning U-2 missions over the Soviet Union. On July 4, 1956, the first U-2 mission penetrated deep into the Soviet Union covering a number of Soviet long-

range bomber bases and overflying Moscow itself. The U-2 missions continued until Gary Powers was downed on May 1, 1960.

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Counterintelligence Special Operations Training - An Argument For Emphasis

ESSAY

by Captain Bruce E. Empric

Within the counterintelligence (CI) field, we need to emphasize the importance of effective special operations training. Far too often CI is looked upon as the prodigal son of military intelligence (MI) within the tactical setting. Commanders of intelligence organizations often are faced with the question of how to best employ their CI assets — a question complicated by the lack of clear-cut guidance on what it is that CI soldiers should do in tactical intelligence organizations. Once guidance is made available, however, we must then work to overcome the inherent reluctance on the part of many commanders and staff officers to use CI personnel to their fullest capacities. From my experience as a CI officer, I can personally attest to the misconceptions, prejudices and outright disdain that many officers (to include those of the MI branch) hold for anything even remotely associated with CI. If we are to succeed on today's modern battlefield, we must integrate all aspects of intelligence to assure ourselves of victory.

While strategic CI organizations are more likely to employ special operations techniques in their missions, I believe that these same techniques have application within tactical intelligence organizations. In a world where low intensity conflicts (LIC) dominate the scene, our CI soldiers must be prepared to engage in operations which will assist the commander not only in protecting his own assets but also in identifying and neutralizing external threats. To operate in a LIC environment, we must prepare our soldiers in the finer aspects of CI special operations. Their ability to successfully employ these techniques is critical to accomplishment of the intelligence support mission in LIC.

I define CI special operations as those activities used in support of specific CI or counterespionage operations. Included in this definition are surveillance (foot, vehicular and fixed), covert photography, and standard and nonstandard communications among others. Mastery of these skills allows the CI soldier to operate with an added advantage in what quite likely will be a very hostile environment.

The most training any CI soldier will normally receive is that from the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Ariz. While training lengths may vary, it is fairly accurate to say that the amount of time devoted to the special operations activities I've already described is rather limited. In order to develop our soldiers to the degree we desire, we must focus our efforts on training programs once they arrive in their designated units.

When I was assigned as the Chief of Security Division, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 1st Special Operations Command (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, N.C., I routinely attempted to send my CI enlisted soldiers to as many training programs as our personnel and work requirements would support. These programs focused on developing their special operations skills and included training in photography, interrogation and surveillance. Through an arrangement with the North Carolina Justice Academy, we were able to send a number of our CI soldiers for residence training in surveillance photography. The costs incurred by the command were minimal since our soldiers commuted to the training each day. The course of instruction ran for one week and exposed the soldiers to all aspects of surveillance photography — from taking the pictures to processing and developing the negatives. Since the instruction was provided by law enforcement personnel, the correlation to CI tasks was rather close. The benefits we derived from this training were used on several Operations Security Evaluations we conducted on our subordinate commands. The high quality of their surveillance photography coverage was in large part attributable to the instruction they received at the Justice Academy.

Commanders at all levels should not unilaterally refuse to support requests for specialized CI training. Every CI professional must diligently work to educate the majority of the Army's intelligence community on the absolute necessity of our CI personnel receiving this training.

My experiences with a strategic CI unit revealed just how critical special operations training is to successful mission accomplishment. When I was assigned in Germany we routinely conducted training in surveillance, surveillance photography and standard and nonstandard communications. Since the hostile intelligence services were very active in our area it was imperative that we were proficient in these skills. We often scheduled all day surveillance training exercises which allowed us to test our ability to operate in teams in an urban setting. In practicing as often as we did, we quickly became familiar with the intricacies of trying to conduct CI special operations over an extended period of time. Although it often looks quite simple on television, surveillance is an extremely difficult undertaking. Proficiency is only developed through practice, coordination and teamwork. On occasion, we trained with a NATO unit in Germany. Through such training, our soldiers were exposed to several new techniques, many of which have been successfully employed in an actual LIC. Our counterparts recognized the extreme importance of sound CI special operations.

We as intelligence professionals must work to ensure that our young CI soldiers are exposed to as much special operations training as possible. Commanders of intelligence organizations must actively seek out challenging training programs which will serve to develop their soldiers' proficiency in these areas. Since they are largely technical in nature and dependent on a large amount of practice, CI special operations will require training time to be allocated in sufficient proportions. While some commanders may be reluctant to do this in the garrison environment, not to do so invites many problems should a LIC require their soldiers to function once deployed.

In summary, the time we invest in CI special operations training now will pay great dividends in the future. Commanders must seek out available military and civilian training programs. REDTRAIN and live environment training (LET) opportunities with OCONUS strategic CI units are excellent means for further enhancing your CI soldiers' skills. Far from being "James Bondish" in nature, CI special operations techniques are certain to play a critical role in any LIC we may see ourselves involved with in the next decade. In preparing now, we will be able to live up to the motto of our corps - ALWAYS OUT FRONT.

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ESSAY

The Army's Stepchild - Technical Intelligence

by Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) William L. Howard

One of our most glaring weaknesses during World War II was our inability to collect technical intelligence. Although the basic role of the soldier has not significantly altered over the centuries, the weapons he uses have changed drastically. Only a few people in the U.S. Army at the time of World War II understood that technological innovations in weaponry could have dramatic effects on the outcome of combat operations. This small group considered it imperative that the Army stay abreast of the current weapon system developments of our Allies, as well as the enemy.

With the advent of the war, the requirements for information on foreign military technology began to come from the highest levels of the Army. The most immediate requirements dealt with information on the German use of radar and rockets and their progress in developing an atomic bomb. Other intelligence requirements were limited to troop dispositions, logistical support and potential capabilities. Information on the design and development of tanks, artillery and small arms remained a low priority.

Most information on the technical capabilities of German weapons came from the analysis of materiel recovered from the battlefield. The Foreign Materiel Branch at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., did the detailed analysis of the captured enemy gear.

The Ordnance Corps and other technical services set up enemy equipment identification units that traveled to the combat theaters to study captured weapons and equipment. In many cases these units conducted battlefield training programs on the use of enemy equipment. Such training had little appreciable impact on operations until after the Normandy invasion in June 1944.

However, as the war progressed and U.S. forces encountered new equipment, technical intelligence units moved with the combat elements and evacuated considerable quantities of materiel. Although jet airplanes, long-range rockets and nuclear weapons cap-

tured the imagination of most high-level planners, the Allied combat developers continued to seek out information on more mundane materiel.

After the war was over, the postwar technical intelligence organization in this country reverted to its prewar size. The Ordnance Intelligence Unit at the Pentagon continued its work on a smaller scale, and a technical intelligence team at Aberdeen Proving Ground conducted extensive research into foreign ordnance which was dominated by captured German equipment. Compared to today's technical intelligence work, their efforts were limited in scope and would prove of little value until the Korean War.

Military intelligence agencies did interview captured German officers to determine combat methods used against the Russians, and they prepared numerous classified studies. In 1947, the Army developed the Aggressor Program to add realism to training, but because of political reasons and a lack of Soviet equipment, the program was not as effective as today's Opposing Forces Program.

Korea and Its Aftermath

During the Korean war when U.S. and South Korean forces began to use captured Soviet artillery weapons, the ordnance technical intelligence experts supplied appropriate technical details, and artillery officers provided guidance on artillery procedures. But in retrospect, American technical intelligence in the Korean War was slow to rise to the occasion. Because of the short duration of the conflict the mission was of little value to the combat troops. However, the work proved of definite value in later years.

In attempting to understand Soviet military capabilities, technical intelligence operatives provided the basic analysis of Soviet equipment and industrial capabilities. The foreign weapons training they conducted paved the way for training innovations such as the present program at the National Training Center.

The Korean War also pointed out some serious shortcomings in our materiel acquisition process. These problems would be resolved in 1962 with the reorganization of the Army, but it would take several more years before the analysis of captured Soviet weapons would have any impact on U.S. weaponry.

The two decades following World War II witnessed several events which on the surface seem to have little to do with weapons design or tactics. But they provided the impetus for future development. One key event was the Russian success with *Sputnik*, which orbited the earth in 1958. Responding to this technological surprise, the Department of Defense created the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, an organization of scientists and engineers who worked on developing advanced concepts in science and technology which might yield important military applications.

By 1961, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was coordinating U.S. and allied intelligence and managing the defense attaches worldwide. DIA drew information together and analyzed it for the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense.

In 1962, the various technical services were reorganized under the new Army Materiel Command, which included the new Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC) as a subordinate command. This organization centralized control and coordination of information coming in from a variety of sources. Unfortunately, the 1962 reorganization had a serious weakness; the lowest level at which a technical intelligence element was authorized was at corps. This element's function was to advise the corps commander, through the G2, about the capabilities of enemy weapons encountered in the field.

The Vietnam Era

As U.S. involvement in Vietnam began to expand, the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion deployed to Saigon. The unit staffed the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC) which included Ordnance, Signal, Chemical, Medical and Engineer detachments and also fielded five "go teams" assigned to collect captured materiel.

Because the early stages of the Vietnam War were primarily infantry-artillery operations, the weapons collected were down side — Soviet Bloc small arms, RPG-7 antitank rounds and RKG-3M antitank hand grenades, for example.

That soon changed when the first enemy rockets hit Danang air base shortly before dawn on February 27, 1967. "First light" aerial reconnaissance discovered the firing positions in an open area northwest of the base. A reaction force quickly recovered some launchers and unfired Soviet 140-mm M14-OF(HE) rockets. The launchers were individual sheet metal tubes, attached to 1x8 planks. There was a simple ratchet device at the rear of the tube to retain the rocket when the tube was elevated. Information at CMEC indicated the easily transportable launcher tubes may have been obtained by disassembling a truck-mounted, multiple-tube rocket launcher of the Soviet BM-14 type.

When incoming rockets hit Camp Carroll, an Army-Marine Corps fire base near the demilitarized zone, identification of the enemy hardware was not so easy. Patrols were unable to recover any launchers or duds. The low dud rate in Soviet artillery projectiles and rockets is strong testimony in favor of the Soviet design. Soviet fuses are rugged and simple, containing only the most essential safety mechanisms.

The appearance of a significant "new" North Vietnamese attack capability was not a total surprise. There had been several hints from captured enemy documents and prisoner interrogation reports that something new was being introduced. However, these hints were vague and pinpointed no particular weapon or weapons system. Then, late in 1966, personnel from Military Assistance Command Special Operations Group returned from a deep penetration mission with two samples of a previously unreported Soviet fuse — the DKZ-B. A quick examination at CMEC revealed that the new fuse was similar to the Soviet GVMZ-7 fuse used on 120mm mortar projectiles and also contained a centrifugal arming device with a delay pellet for bore safety.

CMEC realized that the presence of such fuses in

ammunition caches in Eastern Laos was a clear warning of future employment of a new weapon. But the U.S. intelligence community was unable to identify the new threat because the DKZ-B fuse was simply unknown.

The breakthrough finally came in May 1967. During a rocket attack on the Bien Hoa airbase, an American aircrew spotted the rocket back-blasts and brought fire on the launcher positions. The Viet Cong immediately aborted the attack. When a reaction force went out to search the launch area, they recovered the first complete 122mm rocket and it had a DKZ-B fuse installed in the warhead.

According to CMEC, the rocket recorded a diameter of exactly 122mm. When the FSTC received the information, they suggested that the rocket be measured again because it had to be either 115mm or 132mm — the known calibers of the smaller Soviet artillery. When friendly forces recovered more of these new rockets, FSTC finally conceded that there might be both 115mm and 122mm rockets in the Soviet inventory.

Friendly forces still hadn't captured a 122mm rocket launcher, but the Combined Military Interrogation Center discovered a prisoner who had been a crew member on a 122mm rocket launcher. This prisoner drew a good sketch of the launcher, which he described as having a "single rifling in the tube." There was no apparent or logical explanation for needing a rifled tube to launch a rocket which had both a canted rocket nozzle and spring-loaded canted fins to stabilize it in flight. When a rocket launcher was finally captured, the reason for these unusual features became clear.

Translating the prisoner's words from Vietnamese to English was very difficult because there were no Vietnamese equivalents for most technical terms. What was translated as "one rifling" was actually a spiral cover welded to the outside of the launcher tube, which enclosed a continuous slot in the tube. The stud and roller assembly rode in the slot, imparting a very positive clockwise rotation to the rocket as it was launched. In seeking increased accuracy from an inherently inaccurate weapon, the Soviets had called in the mechanics rather than the engineers. And they had provided a simple fix for a very complex problem. Examination of available photography revealed that the exterior spiral cover was clearly visible in some of the photos of the "115mm rocket launcher." The designation was changed to 122mm.

The next major incident that brought technical intelligence to the Field Artillery's aid occurred just after the TET offensive. Infantry units near the demilitarized zone began receiving incoming fire from mortars across the ridge line. The unit heard the rounds leave the tube and seconds later the rounds impacted. Neither counterbattery units nor observation patrols could locate the enemy artillery unit. Finally, shell fragments were sent to CMEC for analysis. They revealed that the rounds were from a 120mm field artillery piece, not from a mortar. The North Vietnamese artillery had been firing at a maximum range of 18 kilometers; and the incoming shells, when their speed decayed below the speed of sound, produced a "plop" which misled the observers. Once reconnaissance patrols extended their radius out to 18 kilometers, the enemy artillery was quickly located and silenced.

Ordnance specialists also developed fragment identification guides to assist field soldiers in identifying incoming rounds. In the post-Vietnam era, shell fragments recovered in Vietnam were used to produce training aids for crater analysis classes.

Technical intelligence collection activity continued in Vietnam until late 1971 when the vast bulk of the technical intelligence personnel withdrew from the war zone. Collection efforts recovered new Soviet equipment such as the IMP mine detector, artillery weather instruments and a battery commander's scope. These finds provided the intelligence and fire support communities an indication of an ever-improving enemy force. At the national level, it provided the intelligence community with the basic information needed to modify U.S. estimates of Soviet capabilities and to begin work on developing countermeasures. The multiple launch rocket system was one of the Field Artillery systems to profit from the study of foreign technology.

Post-Vietnam

The Soviets' commitment to the sustainment of "wars of liberation" is nowhere more evident than in the designs of their equipment. Their weapons are simple, reliable and extremely durable. Such materiel is ideally suited for equipping military or paramilitary personnel who have a minimum of training and few or no mechanical skills. On the other hand, some U.S. equipment requires so much maintenance that it requires operators with extensive mechanical backgrounds.

We will most likely continue to see obsolete Soviet weapons and equipment in Central America and other areas of Soviet interest. The Soviets' use of the 9M22M 122mm rocket in Afghanistan is well documented. More significantly, the Soviet troops fighting in Afghanistan carried a new series of infantry weapons. They are part of the third post-World War II generation of materiel.

In the training arena, programs such as those begun by the Red Thrust Detachment and the National Training Center do an excellent job of providing realistic training on threat tactics and what might be called close-combat equipment. But, we seem to be handicapped in the area of artillery fire. Should an actual conflict take place, infantry units under fire from unknown and unlocated enemy artillery will naturally contact the nearest artillery unit for help and advice. Field Artillery officers of all ranks must have a working knowledge of technical intelligence operations and where to go for the necessary help or information.

Summary

History teaches us that there will be considerable delays in getting captured enemy materiel to the rear for analysis. Apart from the normal hazards of combat, there are the problems of transporting the materiel, pilferage of war souvenirs and lack of quali-

fied technical intelligence personnel at the combat unit level. Hopefully, the next major conflict will find us better prepared and better equipped to conduct accurate and timely technical intelligence.

Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) William L. Howard received his commission from the Citadel. He is a graduate of the Tank-Automotive Maintenance Officer Course and the Command and General Staff College. He served as the commander of the 11th Military History Detachment in France and the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center in Vietnam. He later transferred to Armor and was an instructor in the Armor Officer Advanced Course. Howard has also served as a consultant on Soviet armor and antitank weapons at Battelle Memorial Institute. He assisted in establishing 96B MOS training at Fort Dix, N.J.

Ordnance Corps Certificate of Affiliation

The ordnance Corps Certificate of Affiliation is ready for distribution to all Ordnance soldiers. To be eligible to receive a certificate, the individual must hold an Ordnance MOS or area of concentration. All Ordnance commissioned officers, warrant officers and enlisted personnel are eligible to receive a certificate. Beginning in the 1st QTR of FY 89, certificates will be issued by schools awarding MOSs or AOCs; therefore, units only need to request the number of certificates for soldiers currently in their units.

Requests for these certificates must be consolidated at battalion level or higher and forwarded to: Office Chief of Ordnance, ATTN: ATSL-O-S, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. 21005-5201. The following information must be included in the request: Name of unit, UIC, military address, POC, telephone number and number of certificates required.

Enemy Prisoner of War Operations

by Major William A. Doyle

Conventional mobile warfare over the last 50 years has usually resulted in the capture of large numbers of prisoners of war by both sides. The law of land warfare and international agreements stipulate the capturing power's responsibilities and codify the great demands prisoners of war place on the support system of an army in the field. Within the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army is responsible for handling prisoners of war for all U.S. forces.[1] Despite extensive U.S. Army historical experience, present Army doctrine is not sufficient to properly perform the prisoner of war handling mission in a theater of war.

As history has shown us, the major combatant powers in World War II and Korea were ill-equipped to properly handle prisoners of war. One analysis of the situation sums up the American experience: "In almost every war in which the United States has been involved, EPW operations have assumed the dimension of an afterthought."[2]

The handling of EPW in future warfare could quickly take on an ethical dimension as men and women in captivity starve to death, die of exposure or die of simple, otherwise curable, medical problems due to a lack of medical treatment. These things have happened to prisoners of war held by Germans, Soviet Russians, Japanese, North Koreans, Chinese Communists, North Vietnamese and it has happened to prisoners of war in U.S. custody as late as 1945.

Towards the end of World War II, the U.S. Army established a prisoners of war camp at Bad Kreuznach, Germany. Here, perhaps 100,000 German prisoners lived for one year in the open with no fixed shelter, no proper food and only limited medical treatment. Sometimes 100 prisoners died every day. Much of this occurred *after* hostilities had ended.[3]

Several problems surfaced from the U.S. World War II prisoners of war handling experience. First, the Army found that responsibility for prisoners of war planning had been divided between the Provost Marshal General in the European theater and the commanding general of the theater's Services of Supply. This division of responsibility resulted in coordination problems that were eventually solved by the transfer of all staff and actions to the commanding general of Ser-

vices of Supply. Second, the Army had to divert significant numbers of tactical units to guard prisoners of war. At one time, the 106th Infantry Division had about 40,000 soldiers assigned to prisoners of war guard duties. Third, although the European Theater of Operations U.S. Army Communications Zone had performed detailed planning for prisoners of war operations, it used World War I historical experience as a basis. Since there were fewer prisoners of war taken by the United States in World War I, the detailed planning was flawed. The 106th found problems in transportation, logistic support, medical support, compound construction and communications.[4]

During the Korean War the Army apparently did not make the best use of its recent World War II experience. Some 135,000 North Korean and Communist Chinese prisoners of war threatened the United Nations Command militarily (by violence and revolt within the camps) and politically (by diverting international attention to the problem). The cost to the United States to correct the situation included the equivalent of two combat divisions, more than $35 million and a loss of U.S. credibility during peace talks.[5]

Ethical, military and political reasons thus exist for the proper handling of prisoners of war. A review of our present doctrine shows that we have neither understood nor heeded our historical experience in this area. Army Regulations 190-8, *Enemy Prisoner of War Administration, Employment and Compensation*, fixes responsibility within the Army for prisoner of war handling. The Theater Army Commander is responsibile for security matters connected with custody of EPW overseas. The Military Police (MP) EPW Brigade Commander is responsible for all matters and operations concerning prisoners of war.[6]

The MP EPW Brigade is subordinate to the Theater Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), one of the major subordinate commands reporting to the Theater Army Commander. The regulation does not fix any responsibilities for prisoners of war handling at

the PERSCOM. The result is responsibilities fixed both at theater Army command level and at a level two echelons below the theater Army command level.

Field Manual 12-3-4, *Echelons Above Corps Personnel and Administration*, notes that the PERSCOM has responsibility for prisoners of war. The manual then states that the MP EPW Brigade Commander, as Deputy Commander, PERSCOM, has responsibility for all matters concerning prisoners of war. There are staff directorates in PERSCOM that would likely concern themselves with prisoners of war staff matters. However, other than the doctrinal requirement for the Operations Directorate to monitor the MP EPW Brigade deployment to the theater, there is no mention of PERSCOM staff directorate responsibilities for prisoner of war handling.[7]

The MP EPW Brigade, unfortunately, is not overseas. In the force structure, the brigade is in the Reserve Component. There are some MP EPW units available presently in the European theater to fill the gap until the brigade arrives; however, these are only company-sized units. The MP EPW Brigade may arrive after hostilities begin. At the very least the MP EPW Brigade will require some pre-hostilities planning in order to accomplish its mission. Doctrinally the PERSCOM is not responsibile for such planning within its staff directorates.

The delegation of the prisoners of war problem in overseas theaters to a Reserve Component MP Brigade is a dangerous solution to an important problem. The theater-based PERSCOM focuses on personnel and administration matters. Prisoners of war matters receive an easy transfer into the hands of a subordinate unit.

Concern with the level of command assigned responsibility for prisoner of war planning is a valid concern. Planning for prisoners of war is difficult, as the Army's World War II European Theater COM-Z and the 106th Infantry Division experience has shown.

The level of command planning is not the only concern. Another is the lack of attention that staff officers pay to the prisoner of war issue. My experience in staff college exercises shows that student officers mostly assume prisoner of war problems away. This experience supports the idea that the present doctrine does not inculcate in staff officers — even the ones whose organizations have the mission — a proper approach to the prisoners of war problem. As a result, we will again have to divert troops and other resources due to faulty preparation in peacetime.

The benign neglect of the prisoners of war problem will be costly, however. Historically, these costs have been military, economic and political. There is a moral cost also, which may have to be paid by U.S. soldiers captured by the enemy and treated with equal neglect. This is a cost that all serving military may have to share in wartime; it is a sobering thought and not easily dismissed.

Another solution (frequently employed in staff college exercises) is to turn prisoners of war over to the host nation. This is an easy solution to our lack of preparedness because it gives the problem to another nation. Since Europe is a mature theater in terms of host-nation support agreements, an examination of this solution in a best-case scenario may prove useful.

In Europe, existing host-nation agreements do not address prisoners of war custody. This is probably for several reasons. First, German (and other nation) support may be consumed in handling civilian refugees. Even if we did turn over prisoners of war to a host nation, the law of war and international agreements stipulate that the capturing power still retains responsibility for prisoners of war. This means that we still may have a job to do ethically and logistically and that we may not be in a position to dictate the rules to another nation. This turnover presumes that the U.S. Secretary of Defense would approve such a thing; which he must do pursuant to DoD directive.

Another facile solution is the evacuation of prisoners of war to CONUS. This very possible solution still requires attention to the prisoner of war issue at theater level for several reasons. First, enormous resources will be required to move large numbers of prisoners of war to the United States. Second, this evacuation probably could not start until U.S. noncombatant evacuation was complete — perhaps two weeks or more — for political as well as morale reasons. Should the war start without warning time, prisoners of war could start mounting up in great numbers before we could successfully move them away. These two or more weeks could present tremendous problems if we were not prepared.

In essence, we have seen that the U.S. Army continues to consider prisoner of war operations as a doctrinal afterthought. The problems of the Bad Kreuznach camp in 1945 could repeat themselves. The needless suffering and death of prisoners of war in U.S. custody is a specter that both the American sense of justice and the law of land warfare will not tolerate. The military threat of ill-handled prisoners of war in our communications zone, the diversion of troops for prisoner of war duty or the political disapproval of an international audience are also equally distasteful outcomes. Clearly we should pay more attention to the issue of handling prisoners of war in our doctrine and then in our training and preparation for war.

Footnotes

1. U.S. Army Regulation 190-8, *Enemy Prisoner of War Administration, Employment and Compensation* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1985).
2. Major Mark D. Beto, "Soviet Prisoners of War in the AirLand Battle," ***Military Review***, December 1984, pp. 58-72.
3. Raymond F. Toliver, **The Interrogator** (Fallbrook, CA: Aero Publishers, 1978), pp. 321-326.
4. Major Jerome B. Wolff, "Enemy Prisoner of War Operations – World War II," pp.5-10. Unpublished student paper, USACGSC (1986).
5. Beto, p. 62; Major Thomas R. Rock, "United Nations Prisoner of War Camps in Korea (1950-1953): A Very Important Lesson Learned the Hard Way," pp. 2-10. Unpublished student paper, USACGSC (1986).
6. Army Regulation 190-8, chap. 4.
7. Field Manual 12-3-4, *Echelons Above Corps Personnel and Administrative Doctrine* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 1983), pp. 2-1, 2-4 to 2-6, 3-0.

Major William A. Doyle has commanded two MI companies with Interrogation of Prisoner of War missions. His experience as S3 of an Interrogation and Exploitation Battalion generated his interest in prisoners of war operations. He wrote a master's thesis entitled "Interrogation of Prisoners of War in the AirLand Battle." Doyle's present assignment is in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters Department of the Army.

Hello, Soldiers!

A new way of doing business is coming to this magazine. I am excited to accept the job as editor and look forward to hearing from you. We'll talk more about that in a moment.

My name is at the front of this book, but I am sneaking in the back pages to tell you that I am not really responsible for this fine issue in your hands. The credit for this issue goes to the assistant editor, Mrs. "Bea" Pease and the super staff that works here. They have stepped admirably into the spot left vacant by Captain Purciello on his way to command his new company. Duty called. I'm glad CPT. P was able to answer.

I want the magazine to become more direct, more SOLDIER-ORIENTED. I am not an intellectual and like to hear good ideas simply expressed. I ask you to use the guidelines for Effective Army Writing when you send me something.

Let me remind you.

1. Organize your thoughts. Put the bottom line up front.
2. Use the active voice.
3. If a short sentence says what you want to say, USE IT.
4. Avoid jargon and spell out acronyms the first time you use them.
5. Break your work into understandable sections and give them subtitles.
6. Write to EXPRESS, not IMPRESS.

Nothing sounds too difficult there, does it? I'll be looking to hear from you. I'm particularly interested in hearing from NCOs in the field and in our schools. This is the Year of the NCO, and what a great subject for an upcoming issue. Help me out. Send me your articles, stories, thoughts, and experiences for, by, and about Military Intelligence NCOs.

One more thing — I'm looking forward to visiting you where you work and go to school. There's a lot of great things happening now in MI, and we need to spread the word.

I'll be seeing you.

John Vance, editor.

A Traveling Salesman Fills a Crucial Gap

by Jamie Bisher

In January 1918, a 53-year old traveling salesman named Charles Albert Waite, moved by America's call to arms against the Kaiser, "consented to do some patriotic work" for the Military Intelligence Division (MID).

At first glance, Mr. Waite, a representative of a stationery company in St. Louis, Mo., may seem an unlikely prospect to have been an undercover intelligence agent, even in those days of desperate need during World War I. He listed his profession as "Sales-man (traveling)." A native of Sundance, Wyo., he spent the first several years of his working career in ranching, prospecting, trapping, lumbering, newspaper reporting, playing baseball and shuffling papers for the American Express Company. For a 53-year old man he was in relatively good shape, although his vision was faulty in one eye.

It was Waite's 18 years experience peddling stationery throughout the Caribbean and Latin America that interested MID. German agents and pro-German factions in South and Central America were a nuisance, sometimes a powerful threat to Allied interests.

The newly established MID lacked authority to commission its own officers. Adequate funding was also a problem. In a letter to Waite's supervisor at the stationery company, Colonel Van Deman, chief of MID, wrote: "Under present conditions, it is impractical for us to give Mr. Waite any remuneration other than a very restricted expense account. He will therefore be dependent as heretofore on his business for normal remuneration." Waite offered his services to MID in January, underwent a physical in May, and by the end of the summer had received his first big assignment.

While pursuing business leads in Panama or Colombia, Waite received a cable from "the Department" that requested an "immediate investigation" of platinum resources in Colombia. He relished this excuse for a break from the stationery business. He took off on a seven-week expedition through the platinum-producing Choco region of northwestern Colombia.

What little was heard of him during those seven weeks seems to have been in the form of coded telegrams transmitted via the State Department. On November 5, 1918, a telegram from Bogota heralded the end of his mission: "Have returned platinum district. Opposition buying a large quantity..."

Waite produced not only a complete report on Colombia's platinum industry, but a variety of other detailed monographs and useful compilations, such as a survey of ship companies and a long list of prominent names in public affairs with local political affiliation and stance toward belligerents in the war. His reports also covered the political situation, the economy, attitudes of the people toward the United States, German activities, the Magdalena River, Cartagena, Santa Maria and Barranquilla. For a middle-aged traveling salesman, he displayed a remarkable grasp of geography, socio-economic issues and geopolitical global strategy.

For a man without as much as a

title or job description, Waite seemed to have no qualms about risking his life to accomplish his extracurricular intelligence gathering tasks. Through some very clever investigative footwork, he pinpointed the general vicinity of a suspected secret German wireless station high in the Paramo Mountains. In Letras, an out of the way village nearby, he spotted a German known as William Mueller.

Wait consulted a poor quality snapshot of a German agent that had been given to him weeks before in the Military Intelligence Office at Ancon, Canal Zone. "I felt quite certain that the original stood before me," he recalled. Mueller had been "implicated in the sinking of a steamship in Savanna (sic) Harbor; also connected with the I.W.W. trouble in the northwest and the East India Coolie Affair in California."

Early in the morning, Waite rode his horse about an hour out of Letras to an obscure mountain trail that he guessed Mueller and other German agents used to access their secret wireless apparatus. Four miles up the trail, at a point where it narrowed perilously, overhanging a deep canyon, he suddenly came face to face with Mueller. Mueller was mounted also. The trail was too narrow to pass one another, and neither man was willing to back up. "I was fortunate in taking the inside of the trail," said Waite. "As I spurred my horse, this speed evidently frightened his horse, or perhaps it was the bump received from mine — however, when I turned around both horse and rider had disappeared over the cliff and had fallen to the bottom about two thousand feet."

Waite attacked the less exciting chores of his volunteer intelligence work with as much zeal. The "resume" in his MID file lists a variety of accomplishments: "Securing of codes; organizing the Americans in different towns with the object of their working together to help the United States cause; investigating cases for the Black List; investigating revolution in Costa Rica." He published pro-American articles in Latin American newpapers, organized networks of local agents and organized an American-sponsored charity for Bogota orphans.

His prolific intelligence career lasted less than 12 months. His services were terminated on April 30, 1919. Years later an MID officer wrote: "It appears that Mr. Waite was commended by the War Department for the services which he rendered the Government on his trips through South America, especially in Colombia. He was informed that his application for a commission in the Army would have been granted had it not been for the sudden termination of the War."

In April 1935, Charles Waite, traveling salesman and secret agent, died peacefully in Brownsville, Texas.

Jamie Bisher is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy. He is a Naval Logistics Analyst for Advanced Communication Systems, Inc. in Alexandria, Va. Bisher is currently researching the activities of the United States and foreign intelligence networks in Latin America, West Africa and the Far East between the Spanish-American War and World War II.

Training Notes

USAICS Mobile Training Team Supports U.S. Army School of the Americas

by Captain Pete Diaz and Captain Carlos A. Cartagena

From July 24, 1988 to October 19, 1988, two instructors from the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) task group, Department of Tactics, Intelligence and Military Science, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) reported for duty with the U.S. Army School of the Americas (USARSA) at Fort Benning, Ga. Their mission was to train 26 Latin American officers from six different countries in the skills required to perform tactical intelligence operations at brigade and battalion level.

USARSA is an international military institution whose mission is to develop and conduct training, based on U.S. doctrine, for Latin American military students. The school provides the means for closer cooperation among the Americas' armed forces and provides students with the opportunity to gain a better perspective of U.S. traditions. All training conducted in USARSA is in Spanish. This includes the preparation of manuals and lesson plans.

The Military Intelligence Officer Course was originally comprised of six distinctive blocks of instruction: Basic skills, tactical intelligence, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) (conventional and LIC), tactical counterintelligence and security, employee management, and internal defense and development. This year, at the instructors' initiative, two new practical exercises were included in the program of instruction. To culminate the tactical intelligence block of instruction, which covered primarily the intelligence cycle, a LIC exercise was administered at the end of the block. This exercise provided the students with an excellent analytical tool that enabled them to practice what they learned in those two weeks of training. In addition, during the IPB block, the instructors were able to combine an unconventional IPB exercise with a conventional one by having the students transition from one theater of operations in Latin America to another theater of operations in Europe. Both practical exercises were received very positively and resulted in a training success.

This type of mobile training team supporting a security assistance program provides both USAICS and USARSA with a wealth of benefits. The experience gained by the instructors and students can be utilized back at their respective home stations to train their own soldiers. The instructors truly believe that the training presented during this particular course is a positive step forward in the fight against the spread of communism and terrorism in the neighboring Latin American region.

Communications for the Next Generation

by Captain Raymond M. Groves

Lieutenant Colonel Andrews' day continued to get worse. It seemed that the enemy knew beforehand his battalion's every move. And, he had just lost contact with his two lead companies. The meticulously planned attack suddenly fell apart. The radios upon which he relied to coordinate his attack were now his worst enemy. Without that link to his lead elements, Andrews could not coordinate the battalion's effort to achieve his objective. Because of his lack of communications, Andrews did not know the full extent of his battalion's problems.

Captain Johnson was trying to keep his men alive. His company was one of the two lead companies in Andrews' attack. Johnson was also puzzled at how the enemy knew exactly what he was going to do. At first, all seemed to be going as planned. His company and Captain Smith's company started their attack in unison, guided by Andrews. They stayed in contact with each other through lateral communications so that gaps along their flanks could be avoided. Their attack had succeeded in pushing the enemy back for almost five kilometers, and the attack was still on its timetable. Then, the communications between himself and Smith were lost. He suspected that they were being jammed. Next, all contact was lost with the battalion operations center. Then the enemy seemed to be hitting them from all directions.

Colonel Alexev, commander of the 31st Radio Electronic Combat Battalion was smiling. The Americans were now fully into the trap that he and Colonel Vasily had planned. The radio intercept that was provided by Alexev's men showed them exactly when and where the Americans would attack next. From that moment on, Alexev simply tracked the penetration of the enemy into the area and set up the ambush along with Vasily's motorized rifle regiment. Once the Americans reached a preselected point in their sector, Alexev would give the order to his jammer operators to cut off the Americans' communications to their adjacent units and higher headquarters. With the loss of their communications, the American offensive would become confused and would slow to a halt. At this time, Vasily's men would attack on all sides to stop the penetration and push them back with a counterattack that would keep the Americans off balance.

This simulated incident is the nightmare of all combat commanders in any army: the almost total loss of communications and subsequent defeat of their forces. We train with and rely very heavily on our communications systems to coordinate our movement to contact to achieve success on the battlefield. But, those communications are vulnerable to enemy interception, exploitation and jamming. The U.S. Army is now taking steps to minimize its communications vulnerability.

The Military Intelligence (MI) battalion is tasked to provide combat intelligence, electronic warfare and operations security support to the division commander and his staff. The battalion's mission is to intercept and exploit enemy communications. To be successful in its mission, the MI battalion must be able to pass mission taskings to the appropriate teams that are operating remotely on the battlefield.

The MI battalion has at its disposal a multichannel link with higher echelons to receive taskings, and a radio teletype net that operates from higher echelons to the battalion and also within its own structure. It also has an FM voice net that is its primary means of communication within its tasking and reporting channels. To protect itself from exploitation by the enemy, the MI battalion employs encryption devices on all communication nets. The voice communications are secured using communications security (COMSEC) equipment. The battalion also uses wire communications and messengers as a backup system for its FM voice communications net. But this, also, can be manipulated by the enemy. So the Army, and MI in particular, has developed new communications systems with which to operate in a hostile environment with secure communications. The new systems are the Single Channel Ground/Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) and the AN/PSC-2 Intelligence Digital Message Terminal (IDMT). Both systems will be used by the MI battalion to communicate in FM voice nets.

The SINCGARS system with COMSEC devices is now being implemented. It reduces the enemy's ability to jam and intercept tactical communications. The SINCGARS system enables the commander and his subordinate users to operate on a single channel or to operate in a frequency hopping mode, making it very difficult for their communications to be jammed, degraded, intercepted and exploited. The SINCGARS will be replacing the standard FM voice communications systems currently being used within the MI battalion. By using the SINCGARS frequency hopping system, we are further enhancing the security of our communications. In order to successfully jam the SINCGARS, one must jam the entire frequency range of the radio. And by adding a COMSEC device to the system, we ensure secure communications within the tasking and reporting channels that are so critical to our operations. This ensures the MI commander a secure means of passing guidance down to the lowest echelon of the MI battalion.

We will be attaching the AN/PSC-2 IDMT to the SINCGARS radios. The IDMT is a hand held, lightweight, digital message communications processor which utilizes burst transmission to send messages over standard tactical radios and their associated COMSEC devices. It will provide a printed copy of the messages when connected to the AN/UGG-74 teletypewriter or a host computer. The PSC-2 is also fully compatible with the SINCGARS system.

One of our most vulnerable areas in the past was the way we transmitted our tasking messages. Because of the detailed amount of information that had to be passed, our messages were quite long and took a great deal of time to transmit. With the IDMT and its burst transmitting capability, lengthy messages can now be passed in less than two seconds. IDMT speeds up our tasking and reporting process, making it more efficient and thereby making us more combat effective. By combining the SINCGARS and IDMT systems, we have a total system that is virtually impossible to find within the frequency spectrum.

These two new communications systems will revolutionize the way we communicate on the battlefield of the near future. To be able to securely communicate without fear of intercept

by the enemy will enhance our tasking to the different systems used for intercept and jamming. This will, in turn, enable us to exploit and jam the enemy's communications.

Hopefully, the introductory hypothetical situation will soon be a thing of the past. Our communications systems will no longer be a weak link, easy to intercept and exploit, to turn against us and defeat us.

We must remember one other thing — our enemies also have the technology that we possess. They, too, can produce a frequency hopping transmitter and are today using burst transmitters in certain communications nets. We no longer enjoy a distinct advantage in our technology. Our enemies also have highly advanced systems with which to communicate, making it harder for us to intercept their communications to pinpoint what they will be doing on the battlefield. This fact is driving us to develop newer systems that can intercept frequency hopping transmitters and exploit their information even though they are transmitting across two or more frequency bandwidths. We are also in the process of developing technology to effectively jam burst transmitters and frequency hopping radios, so that enemy communications will be rendered ineffective as a combat force multiplier on the battlefield.

ROYAL SEARCH

by Captain Jim Dorschner

ROYAL SEARCH, a 2nd Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion (Aerial Exploitation (AE)) air warfare exercise conducted over Scotland May 19-25, 1987, was a long time coming. But once put in motion the entire effort was planned and organized in less than five months.

As originally conceived in late 1979, the then 73d MI Company (Aerial Surveillance) would deploy a number of OV-1D Mohawks from Europe to Scotland to train over the RAF Strike Command Spadeadam electronic warfare range. Spadeadam encompasses several thousand square miles of sparsely populated terrain and possesses a variety of contemporary SAM/AAA emitters as well as simulated airfields and other military targets. Unfortunately, because of flying hour and budgetary restrictions, the 73d's plan never got beyond a brief site survey in the United Kingdom.

By the time the concept resurfaced in 1986, the 73d had become A Company, 2nd MI Battalion (AE). With B Company's RC-12D aircraft, the company provided Commander VII Corps, through their MI brigade, with aerial photography, side-looking airborne radar, electronic intelligence and communications intelligence. The unit's Special Electronic Mission Aircraft (SEMA) capabilities had evolved over the intervening years, as had the threat. The ever-increasing hazards of aerial interceptors (AI) with Beyond Visual Range and short range missiles, as well as forward deployed SAMs, seriously threatened the aerial exploitation battalion's vital wartime mission.

Facing this challenge, 2d MI Battalion (AE) initiated a thorough air warfare training program. Exchange visits were made with other Central Region flying units, including a Canadian tactical fighter squadron.

ROYAL SEARCH was to be the training program graduation ceremony. Four Mohawks and two RC-12D aircraft were to operate from Scotland for a week flying in support of an engaged notional VII Corps. Spadeadam would provide threat SAM/AAA signals to activate radar warning receivers, while two collocated Hornets would act as MiG-29s under control of local ground control intercept radar. NATO AWACS would provide AI warning and control United Kingdom-based, friendly counter-AI fighters.

In August 1986, A Company ran a rudimentary exercise over southern Germany. The Grafenwoehr-based Tactical Radar Threat Generator provided SAM/AAA simulations while the Canadian squadron flew basic intercepts. Shortly thereafter, the battalion was cleared to train in a newly opened EW range. The range at that time was not fully operational and provided emitters of a quality and density significantly less than Spadeadam.

The execution for ROYAL SEARCH was set for late May. Five months of planning began to tie in the various multiservice, multinational players.

The task force departed during the morning of May 19. Exercise day one began May 20 in the briefing room where all aircrews received weather, United Kingdom low fly and Spadeadam procedures, exercise scenario and the day's flying program. Control cell, scenario scripting and briefing support were provided by soldiers from RAF Alconbury.

The first Mohawk was airborne and was followed in succession by two communications intelligence and one electronic intelligence mission. NATO AWACS took station over the North Sea. Another Mohawk and a Spadeadam penetration photo mission launched in the afternoon and the Hornets turned around for what became their standard four-sortie day.

On day two, exercise rhythm took hold. The daily briefing was shorter and more to the point. However, events rapidly deteriorated as the day progressed. No AWACS was available this day and Spadeadam developed technical problems that limited their emitter capability. Finally, at mid-afternoon the field was closed by severe crosswinds.

Day three dawned with light winds out of the east. AWACS and Spadeadam were up and everyone was eager to get airborne. The RC-12Ds were first off followed by the first Mohawk, an electronic intelligence mission, Hornets and Phantoms. These were followed in turn by the second Mohawk, a second electronic intelligence mission, a third Mohawk, a low-level photo plane and more Hornets and Phantoms. The last act of the day was a final debrief.

ROYAL SEARCH accomplished a great deal. For the first time SEMA aviation was played in a realistic Central Region air warfare scenario. SEMA vulnerability, particularly to AI threats, was brought home. More important was the often surprising knowledge, expressed by the pilots, of just how difficult fixed wing SEMA targets are to acquire and successfully attack. Coupled with this knowledge was the fact that aerial exploitation battalion success hinges on a thorough, comprehensive air warfare training program.

The exercise was not error free by any means. It was not an end in itself but, rather, an intermediate objective in preparing for AEB wartime responsibilities.

Unseen Reforger

by Specialist Four James W. Snyder

The recent Reforger deployment, and its follow-on exercise Certain Challenge 88, were designed to be highly *visible*. However, certain operations of this NATO maneuver exercise were designed to be highly *invisible*. In this mock war between V Corps' Northland forces and VII Corps' Southland forces, urban camouflage, psychological operations (PSYOP) and long-range surveillance (LRS) teams were employed.

A number of techniques were used to accomplish the task of blending troops and equipment into the general population. At one location what appeared to be German warehouse workers were actually V Corps military police. At V Corps Headquarters' Current Battle Module, located inside a warehouse, MPs wore blue coveralls and patrolled the grounds on foot. Military vehicles were parked inside the wood line. Essential equipment outside of the warehouse was kept covered by civilian tarpaulins. Soldiers slept and ate in a blue and white German fest tent.

During another operation, the 165th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion sent 17 six-man LRS teams on week-long missions deep into VII Corps' Southland territory. Flown in at night and deployed behind enemy lines, the teams were tasked to observe and report on enemy activity.

Using binoculars as well as night vision scopes mounted on M-16s, the soldiers identified enemy vehicles and convoys. They radioed their information back to the communications platoon using long-range, high frequency encoded Digital Message Devices. The information was then used by V Corps to assess enemy locations and movements.

Each team set up base camps in heavily wooded and inaccessible areas. The team members had to carry enough food for a week. Streams and water purification tablets provided drinking water. Ponchos were used as tents. At the end of the week, the teams left the same way they arrived; on a low flying Blackhawk at night.

Reserve forces also played a major role in the unseen aspect of the exercise. The 4th Company, 14th PSYOP Battalion, from Sacramento, Calif., waged their special brand of warfare in three separate locations along the Main River. Accompanying them were soldiers from the German Army's 4th Company, 850th Psychological Defense Battalion. Together, they conducted deception operations designed to convince opposing forces that large movements of troops and equipment were underway in the area. What appeared to be a lot of movement was in reality only noise broadcast from loudspeakers. By broadcasting realistic track and wheeled vehicle sounds, soldiers' voices, bridge-building sounds and general battlefield clamor, the PSYOP teams provided the "enemy" with realistic — but false — intelligence.

According to PSYOP soldiers, the most important gains from the exercise were in terms of training, getting the opportunity to practice their operations and learning from their allied counterparts.

AN/TRQ-32 Teammate Final Rollout

by Kay Patton

The last three AN/TRQ-32(V) Teammate mobile systems were delivered to the U.S. Army in January 1989. The AN/TRQ-32(V) is a mobile multi-station, ground-based communication intercept and direction-finding system used by CEWI battalions worldwide. The system is the backbone of the CEWI tactical SIGINT capability of the U.S. Army.

This delivery is the completion of the Operator Terminal Update program which incorporated two smart operator terminals, a 15-megabit disk drive and a UHF data link utilizing the AN/ARC-164 receiver-transmitter into the original TRQ-32(V) system.

Leadership Notes

Advice to a New Second Lieutenant

by Captain William R. Gladbach

It is not uncommon for a Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course graduate to be assigned as the S2, a primary staff officer in charge of a battalion intelligence section. What must be done to affect a quick, professional, smooth and career enhancing transition into this position of responsibility?

First of all, when you arrive at your new unit you must meet and evaluate the people you will be working with. Until you really get to know everyone, first impressions are all you have to guide you. Learn from the people you feel are responsible and knowledgeable. You must use this knowledge and expertise in order to gain credibility and to form an identity. Once you have established your credibility and identity, you will truly be in charge of your battalion intelligence section.

Probably the most important person you will have is your NCOIC. Have the good sense to listen to NCOs. But, at

the same time, ask questions, read regulations and SOPs, and learn all you can.

Work with your NCOs as a team. It is this delicate balance of having someone feel like they are working with you rather than working for you that will ultimately establish the NCO-OIC relationship. People will be much more productive when they feel they are a critical part of the mission. Still, never lose track of who is in charge.

At the same time, you should be trying to get to know the other staff members and how their jobs relate to your job. The most important staff member to you will be the assistant S3. He will likely be a captain waiting for a command, close to your age and rank and, therefore, the best person to identify with your situation. He may become your mentor. He can teach you how to work with the different staff elements and battery or company unit commanders.

The S3 or XO, whoever you work for, is usually a major. With him you should also strive to establish that "working with" rather than the "working for" relationship. This relationship does not come with the position. It's something that has to be earned as you prove yourself. The amount of trust your superiors have in you will largely determine your relationship to the unit commanders and the amount of confidence you have in yourself.

Keep lines of communication open among your peers. Your open lines of communication will provide a tap to reliable information. Make sure you are doing your homework so that no one is telling you your job. Establish yourself as the expert; usually a few good inspection results will add some credibility to this. Exert your knowledge and expertise downward. This is done by going to the individual unit special duty officers and training them to be the unit expert.

You will find that once your working relationships are established, and you are seen as the person in charge, you will be in charge. The S3/XO will slowly begin to give you very broad guidance or simply the raw tasking. This leaves you to decide the priorities and the methods of job accomplishment. Of course, there will always be some degree of supervision done by your superiors, but this will be minimal, and you will indeed be in charge of the S2 section.

USAICS Notes

What is Your Sense of History?

by Colonel Joseph M. Blair III

(This article is taken from a speech Colonel Blair gave to the Military Intelligence Museum Foundation's general membership meeting at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., on November 21, 1988.)

What is your sense of history in regard to yourself, our Corps, our Army and our Nation?

Your answer to that question is the key motivation for building our Corps museum. It will be built to honor the men and women who served this nation in our Military Intelligence Corps. It will be built for the future so that students, historians and futurists can research its archives and publish for the good of the Corps, our Army and our nation.

We all need a personal sense of history that ties us to the past and connects us with the future.

My ancestors began in Normandy, France. In the mid-1200s they crossed the English Channel and made their way to the lowlands of Scotland. They became farmers, preachers and soldiers. Blair castle is named for those Scots. In 1668, Mary, Queen of Scots, sent the Blairs to Northern Ireland to fight. In the early 1700s they sailed to Connecticut where some stayed, and others moved on to settle in Pennsylvania and Virginia.

We became a family of educators, politicians and railroaders. We helped establish Pennsylvania's educational system from elementary school through the university levels.

My grandfather was a steam locomotive engineer who began by pushing a broom in Altoona, Pennsylvania. My father was an Infantry private in the 1st Battalion, 141st Regimental Combat Team of the 36th Division during World War II. He froze his hands and feet in the Voges Mountains of France. The Japanese-Americans of the 442d Regimental Combat Team saved his life. I had a father because those courageous men ran a bayonnet charge through a German regiment. Some of those same Japanese-Americans attended my change of command in Hawaii when I gave up command of the 125th MI Battalion (Eyes of Lightning), 25th Infantry Division.

When I took command of the 111th here at Ft. Huachuca, two dozen Hawaiian antheriam flowers arrived. They were sent by Jimmy Yamane, a member of the 100th Battalion, 442d RCT. He doesn't forget me, and I'll never forget the men of the 442d.

So you see, I have a personal sense of history. I am connected to the past and future, and so are you.

But I want to focus not on my personal sense of history but on a significant part of our Corps history.

For a few moments I want to honor a past and important member of our Corps, Major General Ralph H. Van Deman. I want to tie Ralph Van Deman with the present and the future. Van Deman was born at the end of the Civil War in Delaware, Ohio. He graduated from Harvard in 1889 and accepted an Army commission in 1893 when he graduated from medical school at Miami Univ. in Ohio.

Following duty in Cuba, he went to the Philippines as a aide to General Arthur MacArthur. His counterintelligence work help crush a plot to kill MacArthur.

Later, Van Deman was one of the first nine officers to attend the Army War College. General "Black Jack" Pershing was one of his classmates. After the War College he was sent to the Far East where he sent President

Theodore Roosevelt weekly updates on Japanese expansion and intentions. Van Deman was "onto" the Japanese in 1910, long before Pearl Harbor, but you can be sure he had difficulty convincing people of the Japanese intentions at that time. Sound familiar?

Van Deman fought hard to establish an intelligence system for the Army. He was denied many times. However, in 1917 a military intelligence section was established at the Army War College. In fact, the entire War College class of 1916 analyzed and filed reports rather than attend regular classes. World War I was on, and necessity was the mother of invention.

In 1916 Van Deman recognized the need for trained intelligence officers. He directed that selected National Guard officers be trained as tactical intelligence officers. He also recognized that all-source intelligence would provide a superior product and initiated cooperation with the departments of State, Justice and the Treasury.

Van Deman retired in 1929 as a Major General. But, even in retirement he continued to serve the people. He served on the San Diego Harbor Commission, the American Red Cross and the San Diego Chamber of Commerce. In January 1952, Ralph Van Deman died.

Nothing really changes as history and the perceptions of Van Deman surely tell us. The past is part of the present and the future — it's all connected.

We of the military intelligence Corps have an obligation to build our Corps museum at this time. We desperately need a Corps museum with historical archives established for students and historians to research, write and publish historical articles to lead us into the future.

I see the museum as a center eventually connected to our Military History Institute. Our Corps, our Army and our nation can benefit from the great lessons of history concerning intelligence.

Let's get on with this important mission and work of the future.

Always Out Front

(Detach here)

MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION

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NAME: _____ GRADE: _____
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Language Notes

FLPP Update

by Sergeant First Class
Bill Saindon

An article published in the April 1988 issue of ***Military Intelligence*** entitled, Update of Foreign Language Proficiency Pay, does not address the eligibility requirements for Reserved Component soldiers. Paragraph 1 states that initially RC personnel were eligible. Paragraph 2, however, implies only AC personnel are now eligible. The following information should have been included.

Eligibility criteria for ARNG and USAR:

1. ARNG or USAR Officer, Warrant Officer or enlisted soldiers entitled to receive compensation when satisfactorily attending regularly scheduled Inactive Duty Training (IDT) assemblies as an assigned member of the ARNG, USAR Troop Program Unit or Control Group.

2. ARNG or USAR Officer, Warrant Officer or enlisted soldier entitled to receive Basic Pay when serving for a period of one or more days on Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW), Annual Training (AT), Active Duty for Training (ADT), Special Active Duty for Training (SADT), Temporary Tours of Active Duty (TTAD), Full-Time Training Duty (FTTD) and Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Program.

3. Certified within the past 12 months to be proficient in a designated critical foreign language.

4. Assigned to military duties requiring the language proficiency and is performing the duties of the position. (Exception to the duty position requirement are soldiers with PMOS 96B, 96F, 97B, 97E, 98C, 98G or 98Z; all CMF 18 linguists and Warrant Officers in MOS 180A, 350L, 351B, 351C, 351E, 352C and 352G.)

MI POC is Sergeant First Class Saindon, autovon 821-3012 or commercial 602-533-3012.

PROFESSIONAL READER

Carpetbaggers by Ben Parnell, Austin, Texas: Eakin Press, 1987, 204 pages, $16.95.

Using recently released documents and interviews with surviving crew members, Ben Parnell has produced a readable and detailed summary of the activities of the 801st/492d Bombardment Group (H) of the Eighth Air Force during its operations in World War II. Using selected crews, the Carpetbaggers flew modified B-24, C-47, A-26 and British Mosquito aircraft over Europe to drop agents (Joes), supplies and propaganda leaflets to aid the resistance.

In 15 detailed chapters, Parnell presents a chronological summary of the unit, its formation, its missions and the men who served as crew members and in ground support roles. He has supported his chapters with numerous endnotes that clearly indicate the depth of his research and with over 75 excellent photographs of the crews, aircraft and significant landmarks in France and Germany. Despite the well earned anti-American reputation of the French people, readers will find that the Carpetbaggers and their Joes were uniformly well received in France during the war years and were assisted in every way possible.

In addition to covering clandestine aerial insertion techniques that were perfected in World War II, readers will discover valuable tradecraft information on the preparation of agents and their gear, escape and evasion techniques, and other useful information. This is a well written, carefully documented work that will benefit any MI professional who desires to learn more about a very successful intelligence operation during World War II.

Bruce D. Saunders
Command Historian
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School

The War of the Running Dogs by Noel Barber, New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1987, 284 pages, $3.95 paper.

It's sometimes called "the war the Communists didn't win." During its time it was known as the "Emergency" in Malaya, and it began with the cold-blooded execution of three British estate managers on the morning of June 16, 1948. It officially ended July 31, 1960. During those years the concept of revolutionary war took on a new significance in the wake of World War II, while new, and often political, counter-methods were developed and later used as a model for counterinsurgents in other wars.

The War of the Running Dogs is an easy-to-read history of that war. It is not an academic study for specialists — it is a book that is as relaxing and exciting to read as a novel. Yet, it is full of lessons for anyone with more than a passing interest in counterinsurgency.

The book's first chapters lay out the background to the war. In a quick look at the area of operations, Barber discusses key parts to understanding the war: "The Battlefield," "The Protagonists," and "The Planters."

"The Battlefield" discusses the country's geography to include its jungles, people, economics and politics. The author uses anecdotes to bring the subject to life and graphically explain the affects each had on the other and explain the racial differences that separated the Chinese and Malay and European populations. Barber describes the June 16 deaths: "Within a few minutes, Allison and Christian had been bound to chairs in Allison's office. They were shot sitting in them. The Chinese, completely disregarding the cowed and terrified estate clerks, calmly opened the door, walked out — and disappeared."

In "The Protagonists" the author discusses the forces of both the Communist terrorists (CT) and the government: their objectives, organization and personalities. Again, he draws the reader easily into history by telling a story and using actual people and their actions to give insight into the "why."

"The Planters" goes into the people who worked and gave Malaya its economy — the miners, plantation managers and the tappers (who tapped the rubber). Barber explains how their lives were interrelated and how their attitudes affected the war on both sides — the mine and plantation managers and their will to fight and protect their way of life, and the tappers who wanted a better life for their families and, depending on the area, gave active or passive support to the CTs out of choice or fear.

The book is broken down into three major subsections that fit into the "Emergency's" general phases. Phase One, The Communist Offensive, 1949-1951, describes the bleak time when the CTs had the initiative and the British-run government was struggling with how to deal with a political-mili-

tary insurgency. Barber discusses the key decisions made early in the war that over the years had a direct impact on the war's outcome.

Phase Two, Counter-Attack, 1952-1954, describes how the government put together its coordinated response and began to take the initiative back from the Communists. Again, as in many insurgencies, much of the decision making process and actions taken were personality dependent on both sides. Barber takes us into the people who fought the war — from the top leadership to the policeman and soldier on the ground.

In Phase Three, The Road to Victory, 1954-1960, Barber explains the steps the British went through to follow up their successes of the earlier years. Recognizing that the war would not ultimately be won on the battlefield, the government leaders implemented a program to follow through and institutionalize the political and social changes necessary to undermine the Communist threat.

The book's biggest strength is the way Barber weaves anecdotes into history. He uses the storyteller's technique to bring a situation to life and let you see for yourself why something occurred.

The War of the Running Dogs also has many specific examples of guerrilla tactics. You will see how guerrillas can force support from the people and how they execute ambushes. By reading about the personalities of the Communist leadership, you can begin to understand the way a guerrilla fighter thinks and defines victory, versus what a conventional soldier believes.

The book also goes heavily into the importance of intelligence. The need to understand the guerrilla's methods and how to counter them is paramount for any counterinsurgent force. Fortunately for the British, those who made the decisions in Malaya understood this. Colonel Richard Miers commanded the South Wales Borderers and told his men: "It was this world (intelligence) on which we in the battalion were largely dependent for our success, for without good information we were unlikely to achieve much."

The importance of intelligence was also understood by the senior leadership in Malaya. General Sir Gerald Templer said, "Malaya is an intelligence war. You can never beat Communism with troops alone." Because of the recognized value of intelligence at all levels, and its resulting emphasis, the British and finally the Malayan government were able to dismember the insurgent infrastructure and capture or kill almost its entire leadership.

Whole chapters are given over to those involved in the intelligence effort and their methods. Many other chapters emphasize how intelligence played a crucial role in military and psychological operations.

While it would be, and was, tempting to use the Malayan counterinsurgency experience as a model to fight other Communist insurgencies, a careful reading of this book allows you to see why what worked in Malaya would not always work in other countries. The circumstances that created the environment for revolutionary war in Malaya will not always exist elsewhere. The culture and politics may be different. Another consideration often overlooked in asking why the British were successful in Malaya, and the United States was not successful in other countries, is that Britain was the government of Malaya and was not in the position of "advising" until the worst was over and Malaya had its independence (a position the United States was in when it won its last major counterinsurgency in the Philippines at the turn of the century).

The War of the Running Dogs is an excellent overview of an important insurgent war. It is an easy book to read and artfully uses anecdotes to tell the story. At the same time it teaches many lessons that need to be understood by those who attempt to try to compare one insurgency with another.

Captain Raymond W. Levesque
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School

Roosevelt and de Gaulle: Allies in Conflict

by Raoul Aglion, New York: The Free Press, 1988, 237 pages, $22.50.

This personal memoir describes a conflict between President Franklin Roosevelt and General Charles de Gaulle during World War II. The accomplished author had the opportunity to serve as a participant and observer in many of the events which shaped the relationship between these two leaders. He was one of de Gaulle's representatives in the United States during a time when there were mixed views regarding the General. Hence, the reader should be cognizant that the author may not be totally impartial. Yet his style of writing is frank and often humorous, making for enjoyable reading of this very interesting and well written book.

The author suggests the conflict between these two great statesmen resulted from several factors. For example, there was the element of misinformation which came to the attention of Roosevelt and which described de Gaulle as ruthlessly ambitious. Roosevelt also believed that de Gaulle was too dangerous to be trusted. This may have resulted from a fear of de Gaulle's fervent militarism. Another important factor exacerbating the relationship between the leaders was that of obvious different personalities. De Gaulle is described as solemn and austere while Roosevelt is characterized as cheerful and sometimes sarcastic — characteristics not entirely appreciated by the General.

The author also cites other issues to explain their acrimonious relationship. After France's defeat by Germany, the United States favored a policy of total neutralization for France, the opposite of Free France. The view of the Free French as represented by de Gaulle was to bring all French resources under his command. Another factor contributing to the conflict concerned contacting local authorities in French colonies. Some of these colonies were loyal to de Gaulle, but the United States was not willing to contact him about establishing bases or coordinating military policies regarding these territories. There was also the controversial issue of colonialism. The United States wanted to ensure that all countries under French control were liberated as quickly as possible. The Free French, however, believed that no foreign power should interfere in France's overseas sovereignty.

In spite of the difficulties between the two statesmen, their record of accomplishments is described as a mixed one. "On the field of battle, American and French soldiers fought bravely side by side, despite the attitudes of their leaders. On the diplomatic front, however, things were not always simple, and fighting the same enemy did not make for true allies." The author concludes this valuable work by noting that although today each nation follows an independent course and sometimes seeks different goals, the two countries are still united in times of major crisis.

This book should appeal to military historians as well as to students of international politics for a variety of reasons. For example, it helps us to understand how important decisions which affected the conduct of the war and the postwar period were made. It thus helps explain the sometimes strained relationship between the United States and France following the war. In fact, it is noted that de Gaulle refused to attend the official ceremony to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the American invasion at Normandy. The book demonstrates that personalities among great political leaders must be considered when one attempts to predict relations between such leaders. Finally, the moral lesson of this book may be that even though political allies are in conflict for various reasons, current expediency may prevail over this conflict and bring about results which are mutually beneficial.

William E. Kelly
Auburn, Ala.

Better a Shield than a Sword

by Edward Teller, Stanford, Calif.: The Free Press, 1987, 257 pages, $19.95.

The United States concluded its World War II battles against Japan with an atomic weapon, the likes of which the world had never before seen. The project which developed the atomic bomb was the Manhattan Project, and Edward Teller was part of it.

Better a Shield than a Sword is an

intriguing glimpse into the world of a wonderfully rational man whose works have had an unmistakable influence on the lives of everyone on this planet. Teller is a physicist. His circle is occupied by some of the finest minds in history.

This book was not an easy book to read, probably because the author's basic premise, that we are turning away from science, is true. As difficult as the concepts are, Teller does a magnificent job of bringing them home to the heart and sensibilities of the reader. **Better a Shield than a Sword** deals with a multitude of issues all pointing to Teller's belief that science and technology are tools which can improve human life virtually without limit. But, if misused, they can serve equally well to bring about mass destruction. He explains that the only way to secure success is to share what we learn openly and freely with the rest of mankind.

Teller says that the Soviets are ahead of the United States in both offensive and defensive capabilities and although we are not generally inclined to believe this, he provides a number of very strong indicators that they are. As I read, I got infected by his belief that we Americans are flippant in our planning and execution of very costly programs, not wanting to be outdone by anyone. By comparison, Teller portrays the Soviets as deliberate and practical in their lives and actions. The tortoise and the hare come to mind.

Teller's book gives the clearest explanation of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) that I have seen. With such information we are able to seriously consider the alternatives before us. Since SDI is purely defensive, opposition to it implies aggression, which Teller feels is bad in any form.

In this book we have the precious opportunity to wander off with the author into a reality into which we should all propel ourselves. Yet, Teller's challenge to us is presented as though we would never have the good sense to accept it.

If you like science and common sense, I recommend this book as a stimulating weekend companion.

Chief Warrant Officer 2 Carl C. Isakson
751st MI Battalion

Battle for White Russia: The Destruction of Army Group Center, June 1944 by Gerd Niepold, London: Brassey's Defense Publishers, Ltd., 1987, 287 pages, $48.00.

In Battle for White Russia, Gerd Niepold asks some very important questions about the Soviet defeat of the German Army Group Center in the summer of 1944. He also makes several broad statements about his book having "some lessons to teach about the defense of Western Europe today," and that "conclusions can be drawn from a study of this defeat ... (that may) open the way to a fundamentally better defensive system." Overall, Niepold discusses the historical questions in excruciating detail (over 200 pages) but comes up short (only 22 pages) in drawing any fresh conclusions.

Niepold sets the stage for his book by quickly reviewing the events of World War II up to the spring of 1944. Included in this summary is an in-depth discussion of German and Soviet forces and their deployment through May and June of 1944. Throughout the descriptions of strengths and positions, several bits of intelligence-oriented information can be gleaned. First, the "Army Group clearly perceived the serious danger posed by the combined effect of the unfavorable position of its northernmost armies in the deep salient and the lack of mechanized reserves." Second, the Germans fully realized a Soviet front faced each German Army. Third, Army Group Center expected only holding attacks while Army Group North Ukraine was expecting the main attack. Last, by the middle of June the "almost complete cessation of signals intelligence as a result of (Soviet) radio silence" made information gathering much more difficult.

Chapter Five (German Appreciations of the Situation) and Chapter Six (Final Review of German Intelligence) are excellent for anyone interested in gathering and analyzing information. Both chapters paint a clear picture of how accurate intelligence from information gathered at the front lines could be misunderstood and misinterpreted when finally analyzed by higher headquarters. For example: Realizing the main air force concentrations in their sector were "disproportionately strong in relation to the ground forces," the German Army High Command failed to reflect this in their intelligence estimate. The Germans had very good reconnaissance but were unable to translate this information into usable intelligence. Niepold summarizes the effect of intelligence activities on the Soviet offensive when he writes, "In particular ... (the Germans) failed to appreciate the large numbers of tank and artillery formations, the devastating effect of air support on a scale they had not previously encountered and the scope of the Soviet strategic reserves." Ultimately, the German Army Group Center was not prepared for the Soviet 1944 summer offensive.

Much of the rest of the book describes particular operations and results. Battle by battle, division by division, the battle for White Russia is portrayed. Most of Niepold's original questions are answered. Questions such as: What did the two forces look like? How were they led? What were the consequences of this army group being defeated? are answered to a degree that only the most avid reader of historical battle data would enjoy.

Niepold concludes his book by trying to fulfill his thesis about lessons from this battle that are applicable today. Some of his conclusions are good insights while others merely echo many of the principles of war. Researchers of historical lessons learned may find the last 20 pages interesting as they compare these conclusions with other authors'. Casual readers, if they can get through the bulk of the text, will only be interested in those comments that apply to their field of specialty or expertise. Topics include military command, training and force structure. Utilization of reconnaissance assets is the only area of specific interest to intelligence professionals. Therefore, although several chapters of this book may help fill in the blanks for those researching historical references to intelligence and its place on the battlefield, **Battle for White Russia** is not a "must read" book for military intelligence professionals.

First Lieutenant Bryan Boyce
Fort Carson, Colo.

Mighty Stonewall by Frank E. Vandiver, Texas: Texas A&M Press, 1988, 494 pages, $27.50 cloth, $13.95 paper.

This very traditional biography of Thomas Jonathan "Stonewall" Jackson is a fine addition to the library of a serious Civil War student, but it is not particularly well suited to the general military reader. The focus of **Mighty Stonewall** is strictly on Jackson's life and actions. Seldom does Vandiver attempt to define Jackson in terms of the impact he had on military tactics and operations as they evolved during the war. Vandiver focuses on a chronological accounting of Jackson's life, never addressing the position Jackson holds in history through his application of modern technology and compensatory force multipliers.

Jackson is enshrined in the Southern Valhalla of Civil War heroes. In the popular view, Jackson was a general who never knew defeat. He is viewed as a tireless campaigner, who never lost his nerve or his offensive spirit. Vandiver does a superb job

of eliminating this mythical and simplistic Stonewall Jackson and illuminating the true Thomas Jackson.

Vandiver's Jackson is a complicated and sophisticated individual. From his earliest days he was an intelligent, ambitious man, but also, "a mountain man ... he had the blunt honesty, the firmness and the self-reliance of a frontiersman." Jackson's well known rigid beliefs in the Lord and sense of religion were not innate qualities but were developed during his adulthood. This adult faith and belief strengthened an already firm and stubborn character. The author demonstrates over and over how Jackson's intense personal drive and conviction of his own correctness allowed him to triumph where a lesser man would have failed.

Jackson had no "magic" answer to the problems faced by an outnumbered and poorly equipped army. Instead he retained faith in the basics of a superbly trained and disciplined force, depending on the power of a fiercely aggressive offense to keep enemies off balance. To compensate for weaknesses in numbers and equipment, Jackson stressed OPSEC, deception, surprise and avoidance of the destructive battles of attrition which Northern generals sought. Vandiver shows how Jackson evolved throughout his career, honing his skills, tactics and personal style with each encounter with the Union forces.

Gradually, as Jackson's personal style emerged, Union forces had less and less chance of defeating his forces. This study discloses a leader who utilized every possible resource to compensate for Southern national and organizational weaknesses. Never content to allow any enemy the initiative, Jackson is the model of the aggressive, outnumbered, outgunned leader dominating his opponents and the battlefield through sheer force of will and mastery of tactics, technology and geography.

Mighty Stonewall is a strong biography of an extremely important Civil War figure. The author is particularly adept in tracing the complicated influences which shaped Jackson's character and deeply held moral beliefs. In addition, his use of a large number of primary sources and extensive footnoting mark this as a well researched and dependable account of the man and the era. The descriptions of the geography and operations in the Shenandoah Valley are noteworthy in their clarity and simplicity.

Unfortunately, Vandiver is not as strong in several other critical areas. Maps are poor and hard to link with the text. This is extremely irritating for a reader who must follow the complicated maneuverings of large battles and long campaigns. It is also difficult to fully understand this biography without a preliminary understanding of the armies in question and the tactics they employed. This further hampers the general reader.

The major problem with this book is the almost total failure to link Jackson to the major changes he represented in military operations. Jackson's use of railroads and massed artillery, and his integration of the products of the industrial revolution with traditional military principles are only minor elements in this biography. For the military reader, the role Jackson played in altering American military operational concepts, and his operations as a model for fighting outnumbered and winning, are critical unaddressed elements in this work.

While **Mighty Stonewall** is an insightful, well researched biography of a historic figure, it does not expand its focus beyond that of the traditional biography. As such its usefulness to all but the dedicated military student is questionable.

Captain John F. Beck
Pepperell, Mass.

POLAND: Socialist State, Rebellious Nation by Ray Taras, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1986, 200 pages, $27.50

The inherent contradiction in Polish political life — a nation of fiercely proud people who for the past 20 years have been struggling to achieve lasting independence but who, since the end of World War II, have had to "toe the socialist line" while being militarily dominated by one of their historic arch-enemies — is one that is of great interest to the intelligence community. Are the Polish people vehemently anti-Communist or are they simply looking for socialism that "works"? In this book, **Poland: Socialist State, Rebellious Nation**, Dr. Ray Taras, assistant professor of political science at Tulane Univ. attempts to answer this question and others.

Taras has compiled a great mass of information and has presented it in a logical and eloquent manner. The only thing lacking is a strong personal opinion on any of the topics presented. Those parts of the book that were the most interesting were the ones where Taras ventured his own insights. An example is in the first chapter which covers Polish history from the earliest Slavic settlements through the end of World War II. The popular notion held widely by Poles of Napoleon as a liberator (he is mentioned in the Polish national anthem as an example of victory to follow) is effectively refuted. However, I disagreed with the author's appraisal of the inter-war period on some points. It has become popular among scholars of contemporary Polish history to at least partially legitimize the imposition of "socialist" (Communist) rule in Poland by contending that the economic and political conditions in Poland between World Wars I and II were so bad that the surviving Poles would have formed a socialist-type government with or without the help of the Red Army. This sentiment is expressed even more strongly by Neal Ascherson in **The Polish August: The Self-Limiting Revolution** (New York: The Viking Press, 1982). What I objected to the most was Taras' treatment of Marshal Jozef Pilsudski. Although Pilsudski is rightfully referred to as a man of "military genius", the author does not fully understand the frustration of this great and honorable man in his attempt to preserve that for which he had fought for many years — a Poland untroubled by the extremes of both the far left and right, and Polish national independence that is not based on the indulgence of or on numerous and binding treaties with other nations. It is not surprising, then, that to this day Poles invoke his name as an inspiration for self-determination.

Taras' assessment of events since the end of World War II was objective about the realities of Communist rule. This book is a very detailed presentation of facts and statistics and, as such, valuable to anyone who wants to intimately acquaint themselves with the mechanics of the government (party), economy and social movements in Poland today. In the succeeding chapters one encounters an in-depth analysis of the trends and vicious cycles which dominate Polish economics and governmental/party affairs and the social reactions to both. Whereas the various regimes in Poland have thought that an improvement in economic conditions would quell political discontent, Taras, backed by the opinions of Polish politicians and economists (both dissident and governmental), seems to think that if the Poles first win the right to self-determination that they will opt for a socialist system that "works." In his conclusion, the author does state that it is "a simplistic view that holds that socialism is fundamentally incompatible with the country's national traditions and values."

In addition to what I considered to be the main thrust of the book, other topics were covered. These included international relations (considered to be inextricably linked to those of the Soviet Union), church-state relations (always significant in Poland), and analysis of class structure (social standing versus earnings) and an exhaustive look at Polish arts, letters and popular culture. Even with the lack of strong voice, I recommend this book because of the amount and detail of information provided and because it is a more detailed and subjective alternative to official publications that deal with this area of interest.

John A. Demboski, Jr.
Intelligence Operations Specialist

Air Defense Artillery (Army Lineage Series) compiled by Janice E. McKenney, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985, 429 pages, $27.00.

Army historians and other interested parties will hail the publication of this dense volume, instantly the definitive reference on Air Defense Artillery lineage and honors. Those who mistakenly see ADA as a Johnny-come-lately without much of a mission since 1945 will be surprised to learn that it has plenty of lineage — dating back to the Coast Artillery — and honors. As such this book will be an antidote to any lingering sense of rootlessness among Air Defenders and an ally in the recent (and successful) drive to restore the branch's morale, mission and materiel.

The editor of this book, a supervisory historian at the Army's Center of Military History, assembled it largely out of the Center's vast organizational history files. It was an ambitious undertaking, but in the end McKenney and her colleagues may have spared themselves an even greater burden: having to answer countless inquiries on the provenance of Air Defense units. With this book in hand, researchers will be able to fend for themselves.

It is an attractive production. A large-format paperback, it contains 16 color-plate pages illustrating unit coats of arms. Lineage, campaign participation and decorations for the 29 units covered are given in outline form. A helpful glossary of lineage terms rounds out the package.

It may be unfair to criticize a book, especially one as useful as this one, for what it isn't, but one wishes that more of an attempt had been made to hold the interest of the casual browser. Even a thumbnail history of the branch would have made this book more meaningful and would have served to place the exploits of the units listed into some sort of context. As it is, many people will consult this book, but only the indefatigable minu-



tiae-monger will read it. In fact, most researchers are likely to spend more time in its pages than they would prefer. Because there is no index, tracking down inactivated or redesignated units is at best a nuisance, at worst a small ordeal. Persistence is rewarded, however, with citations that are models of accuracy if not comprehensiveness and with unit bibliographies that sometimes — not always — yield useful references in the secondary literature.

Those shortcomings in the literature are not, of course, the fault of the present author. (She is indeed to be congratulated for her perseverance.) Since the branch's inception in 1917 until recently, Air Defenders have been wrestling with their own identities. The World War I experience, while auspicious, was fleeting. The 1920s and 1930s, an era of austerity and hard budgetary choices, was a time of struggle for the fledgling branch. World War II vindicated the Air Defense mission but also pointed up an irony that has dogged the branch from the first: its finest hours often have taken place when everything else American was going to pieces. The air defense of Corregidor, in which the antiaircraft gunners fired at the attacking Japanese until there was nothing left to fire with, is typical in this respect. And since 1945, American fighting forces have enjoyed near-complete air superiority, rendering the Air Defense seemingly superfluous. All the while, the branch was fighting an unsuccessful bureaucratic battle with the Air Force to retain the air defense mission within the continental United States. More recently there was the DIVAD (Sergeant York) debacle — a sad episode for the Army and ADA particularly.

To be sure, the Air Defense has produced its share of heroes and heroics. The defense of Antwerp and the Rhine bridges during World War II are noble chapters in American military history. On the whole, however, the history of this branch has not been of the pulse-pounding, self-congratulatory sort. It has been, rather, a history that does what history does best, which is to exhort and illuminate. In part because the Air Defense has taken its history seriously and learned from it, it stands today on the threshold of a brighter future. McKenney's indispensable book will aid materially in that process.

Jesse H. Stiller
Command Historian
Fort Bliss, Texas



New Technology and Western Security Policy (Collected Papers from the 1984 Annual Conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies) edited by Robert O'Neill, Hamden Conn.: Archon Books, 1985, 178 pages.

This compilation of the papers presented during the 1984 Annual Conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, presents the military reader with discussions at a "world level" relating to the impact of new technology in all facets of Western security. The editor, Robert O'Neill, Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, moderates and ties the "loose ends" together in a masterful summation that will leave as many questions unanswered today as it did at the conference itself.

The conference centered on the impact of new technology on both weapons systems and the political/military realities surrounding their adoption. A number of themes were reiterated again and again in the readings, the chief among them was, "technological developments pose problems for the viability of strategic systems"; "technology helps the most in the areas of target acquisition, electronic warfare, C3 and new materials for missiles, armor, engines, etc."; and finally, "technology effects operational concepts." These may appear simple and basic but the papers presented delve into the subtleties of the concepts and are entertaining and informative.

The military reader must have a grasp of strategic terms to fully appreciate this work. Terms such as SDI, MAD, ET and FOFA crop up and must be understood for the readings to make sense. A very interesting facet for this reviewer was the discussions of the AirLand Battle concept that in 1984 had just been adopted by the U.S. Army in the revised Field Manual 100-5, published two years before. The student of strategic/tactical concepts will also enjoy the discussions of Soviet OMGs that were just beginning at this time and the questioning of Soviet doctrine, especially commander independence in action, that enable the reader to see the flow of concepts and not simply their statement as fact.

Political control of operations in the "new technology" environment is addressed as are issues of arms control and, an interesting concept for this reviewer, European versus U.S. research and development that figured prominently in two of the final readings. One author cited the Soviet adoption of new technology while saving the old as a prime example of technological change that occurs without sacrificing military effectiveness, something we in the United States often forget as we court new devices and instruments. Military readers will especially enjoy the papers presented by Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Brent Scowcroft addressing strategic systems, an area with which he is intimately familiar and the paper "New Conventional Force Technology and the NATO-Warsaw Pact Balance: Part 1" by Dr. Steven L. Canby which is a fine overview of AirLand Battle but critical of Deep-Attack doctrine. Again, the reader must be familiar with Field Manual 100-5 to enjoy this particular offering.

The conclusions of Professor Wolf von Baudissin sum up the conference themes in 10 theses, the final thesis being a "truism" that the reader will recognize as simple fact:

"Both Sides – East and West – must learn that their security depends on others feeling unthreatened. Only stable systems, internally as well as externally are calculable and reliable; only they can make durable compromises and enter fruitful cooperation."

The development of new technology MUST serve that unthreatened feeling.

Captain Rick Ugino
ARNG, Rochester N.Y.



Captains Without Eyes: Intelligence Failures in World War II by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., Boulder, Colo.

Lyman Kirkpatrick's **Captains Without Eyes: Intelligence Failures in World War II** is a "must-read" book for every intelligence soldier. Originally published in 1969 by the MacMillan Company, Westview Press reprinted the book in 1987. The problem of foresight, probably the key problem facing us as intelligence professionals, is the main focus. The book gives clear-cut examples of what can happen when the intelligence officer fails to provide predictive intelligence to the commander.

Kirkpatrick, a former intelligence officer, stresses that although the study of history may not be the cure-all for intelligence programs, it can be a useful endeavor. He examines, using the case study method,

five intelligence failures of World War II.

He cites that, "In all studies of battle one aspect looms large. Why was it fought? And why at that time and place? But this is one of the most elusive aspects of all battles, unless the commanders on both sides record in detail this reasoning. It is elusive because it involves the least accurately recorded of all military activity: the information of intelligence on the enemy that was considered before the battle."

Kirkpatrick writes that if a captain (national leader) is not given adequate intelligence on the enemy, or disregards what intelligence is provided, disaster can follow. A key quote covers the importance of predictive intelligence and points to what we now call the event template (graphically at the tactical or operational level; mentally at the strategic level). Kirkpatrick states: "Military Intelligence must assess more than the disposition of enemy forces, the location of fortresses and defenses, or even the probable war plans of the country. *It must assess what the enemy will do under certain circumstances.*" (emphasis added)

Kirkpatrick examines what occurred preceding Operation Barbarossa (the German invasion of the Soviet Union); Pearl Harbor; the Allied raid at Dieppe; Operation Market Garden at Arnhem; and the Battle of the Bulge. The first two mentioned above are examples of strategic failure. The Dieppe raid is an example of tactical failure. The last two, stand as failures at the operational-level of war.

"Every intelligence officer can have some effect on the battle – by what he believes or does not believe; by what action he takes or does not take." An example is Kirkpatrick's chapter covering the raid on Dieppe.

First, we must examine a problem which still surfaces at times in current operational planning. "It is somewhat ironic that the classic method of most military services is first to present the operational plan of battle and then, almost as an afterthought, an analysis of the enemy to be encountered in accomplishing the outlined objectives," writes Kirkpatrick. This points to the importance of the intelligence staff conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield. All-source analysis, timely dissemination of intelligence, and, of course, collection management is also important.

In 1942, Allied planners were under heavy pressure from Stalin to open a second front. Dieppe was chosen for a division-sized raid. The reason primarily was because Dieppe was a medium-sized port with average defenses.

Unlike the German defenders, Allied planners failed to take into full consideration METT-T factors. The local German commander based his defensive positions on METT-T factors which showed where any attacking force would be channelized. Allied intelligence failed to spot key pillboxes and a ten-foot high sea wall covered by antitank and machine guns. German field artillery observers had excellent observation posts from which to call in deadly fire on any attacking force. This failure alone resulted in the devastation of the Royal Regiment of Canada. The unit landed with 554 officers and men. Only 67 returned.

One of the principal problems was Allied over-reliance on a single-source of intelligence. Staff officers believed aerial imagery would reveal German defenses of any significance. Proper IPB, based on multisource information, would have probably detected the sea wall.

Market Garden was planned and executed on short notice. The premise of the whole operation was to lay down a blanket of airborne troops to secure key bridges along a given axis of advance. Armored forces would advance and conduct a linkup within 48-72 hours. This was fine, conceptually. However, Allied intelligence officers failed to take into consideration the terrain restrictions which would limit tracked vehicles to existing roads. Off-road movement was virtually impossible. Secondly, the Allied underestimated the German forces facing them, including making the mistake of not confirming HUMINT reports of SS units being located near Arnhem. This was where the British First Airborne Division ceased to exist as a combat unit. It literally became a "bridge too far" because of the lack of appreciation of METT-T.

The Battle of the Bulge is a classic example of overestimation on both sides. Hitler overestimated the weaknesses of the American infantry units. His use of COMINT in deciding where to attack is admirable, but he failed to consider the American ability to reinforce quickly. German radio security and OPSEC in general were outstanding, thereby ensuring tactical surprise when the attack kicked off.

Allied intelligence was concerned over where the German Sixth Army was and what it would do. Intelligence staffs at all levels were briefing the possibility of a German counterattack but couldn't pinpoint where. It was the Allied belief that the German generals would counterattack where the Allied threat was greatest, not what Hitler would do under similar circumstances.

The attack in the Ardennes was an intelligence failure for the Allies primarily because of the lack of information collection. Normal sources were simply not available. Bad weather conditions limited air recce. The chance of capturing documents or prisoners was slight in sectors where forces were not in contact.

The German attack on Russia and Japan's attack on the United States are examples of intelligence failure at the strategic level. Both are cases of too much "noise" and too little analysis. Key leaders had indications of impending attacks but in both cases failed to take sufficient preventative action.

Stalin had plenty of intelligence indicators of impending attack but failed to alert his forces. American military leaders issued a "war warning" on November 27, 1941 to major commanders in the Pacific but to no avail. December 7th arrived, finding American sailors "sleeping-in"; the fleet's routine for a Sunday morning.

History does repeat itself. Readers should remember Sunday morning, October 23, 1983. American intelligence failed to effectively consider the cultural factors of the threat facing the American forces in Beirut, Lebanon. The result: 241 American servicemen killed.

In summary, **Captains Without Eyes: Intelligence Failures in World War II,** provides classic examples of what intelligence staffs should not overlook. It describes what leaders need to expect and demand of their intelligence officers. The price is too high to be otherwise.

Captain Eric K. Naeseth
Annapolis, Md

Remaking Japan by Theodore Cohen, edited by Herbert Passin, New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1987, 533 pages, $27.50.

The roots of Japanese "success" can be related with age-old patterns in that Asian society, characterized by adroit decision-making, concentrated energy, unity of purpose and the submersion of self to achieve a great strength through shared efforts and common goals. Today we associate with the Japanese a controlled temperament, dedication and conviction. Business pundits are quick to explain and illuminate the Japanese path to success, yet how different was the conquered Japan of 30 years ago and how easy to forget. Postwar Japan belonged to the last generation and Cohen leads us back to one of the main pivotal points of Japanese history during which so much of the present booming economy began. The economists quickly pass over what Cohen remembers and explores, when the United States and MacArthur and his staff set Japan on a new course that in time would ironically emerge to challenge the industrial West in its own sphere.

For six years a handful of Americans of basic liberal, "New Deal" persuasion exercised a degree of control over postwar planning in MacArthur's court. Cohen was one of these in the immediate postwar years. While little of his book shows a coherent political philosophy, he is happy to find his place in a very moderate left-of-center group of administrators. (There is much throughout the book on the Americans' ability to anticipate and deflect Marxist influences in Japan during those years, particularly in the labor field.) Cohen was

labor relations chief under MacArthur, one of his principal aides and was unusually young as a top officer. Perceptively, Cohen describes a succession of steps in the transformation of Japanese society, from that of landlord and serf to the multilevel but unified, democratic culture that we know today. He writes with a totally American perspective but with 28 years of experience in Japan, chiefly in business. Yet, his account remains that of an outsider, writing after decades of experience in Japan.

Cohen focuses on MacArthur's deliberate effort to reshape a society of 70 million into one that was essentially Western in political outlook. The more interesting passages described the personalities and the interplay between MacArthur's chief advisers, both military and civilian. Cohen presents an unusual, sensitive and critical portrait of the general; admiring yet disparaging. MacArthur is pictured an unapproachable and arrogant (hardly a new estimate), while unusually canny, correct and dedicated in his adherence to old, populist values for a truly democratic and equal society. Cohen, still annoyed decades later with MacArthur's occasional imperiousness, must directly credit the general with one of America's greatest accomplishments of the 20th century. It's a detailed, nostalgic story of a small, dedicated (and sometimes divided) staff coping with the immense complexities of reordering an intricate foreign society. Civil government and military order were imposed with a measure of understanding, if not sympathy for the vanquished. Cohen, who died before the English language edition of his book appeared, views the U.S. occupation in which he participated as one of the proudest achievements of postwar American foreign policy, and an event central to the development of Japan's modernization. It is a recurring theme in the book that the occupation was a necessary step for Japan to pass through in order to arrive at its present position of wealth and success. This step he calls the "third turn" in the transformation of Japan's society, a concept he repeatedly comes back to. The first turn was Japan's absorption of Chinese language and culture in the 7th and 8th centuries; the second turn came at the end of the 19th century and saw the acceptance of some Western concepts regarding industry, government and the military establishment. The third turning brought postwar renewal within a somewhat Western pattern.

Cohen was originally brought into government service as an OSS analyst just prior to Pearl Harbor. He became a major Washington intelligence specialist on certain aspects of Japan's industry and possessions in the Pacific. Unfortunately, he gives us little on the role of the analyst, on how information was interpreted, passed on and accepted by higher authority. The book is specifically on the occupation power in Japan and the many administrative incidents and issues that occurred: the policies that were developed on land reform, labor unions, business reorganization, the termination of all-powerful trusts and the occasional conflicts between the Civil Affairs Division officers and those of the Military Government Mission and OSS. He does give us an insider's view on the gradual formulation of the surrender policy, military command structure and the tripartite American program to disarm, demilitarize and democratize a defeated foe. Some individuals are praised for their astute understanding and influence: Joseph Grew and the "radical reformers" who, as the war wound down, seemed to be forever fighting off the influence of the "Old China Hands" with a very different identification and orientation. Bureaucratic warfare was waged within the occupation forces after the end of the "real" war.

Towering over this infighting, (and Cohen would appear to have been one of the major partisans) was MacArthur, dominating and controlling his command. (It is asking a bit much to accept Cohen's view of MacArthur as Japan's national leader, an interpretation probably now insulting to our Asian "partner.") Cohen's view of the U.S. administration as a shadow government, secretly controlling Japan's political scene in the postwar decade is also a bit exaggerated. There was little secret about it. Analysts of Russian foreign policy may find some interest in Cohen's reports regarding Stalin's maneuverings to gain some position in Japan.

MacArthur is seen by Cohen as a remote figure, with unusual working habits that isolated him from all but a few advisors. He spoke to few Japanese and observed few close at hand. Yet his judgment was often impeccable, leading him to feel for the right solution while often rejecting the political decisions and advice of his own staff. MacArthur is shown commanding full loyalty and support and returning it. In matters of intelligence he had initially maintained a split, with G2 granted to Charles Willoughby and civil intelligence and counterintelligence operations assigned to Elliot Thorpe during the war and shortly after. Later, when CIC and police functions were combined under Willoughby, an immense concentration of power was created. Cohen's view is that of a mid-level administrator and Willoughby is portrayed for the worse.

The road to today's business, economic and industrial accomplishment can undoubtedly be credited to many of the better aspects of Japanese character. But that road led through a minefield of American postwar planning. Cohen notes how relations between the United States and Japan gradually slipped through a misunderstanding of cultural habits and values. Much attention is given to the relations between American soldiers and Japanese women, with good intentions clouded in many poignant stories showing clashes in tradition.

The major part of the book, however, relates to the reordering of Japanese business: wider ownership, the breakup of Zaibatsu trusts and mandated decentralization. United States-Japanese relations are described as a broken dialogue. That "third turn," in Cohen's terminology, saw Japan beginning the postwar years with an overwhelmingly Pro-American concensus. The period ended with an emotionally divided Japanese public and an incomplete alliance. The occupation is seen as an event invaluable and necessary to free the dynamism of the Japanese people from old methods and structures. Yet much unavoidable friction resulted in reaching that success.

Cohen's book is now supported by the release of **The Occupation of Japan: U.S. Planning Documents, 1942-1945**, appearing in a microfiche series from the Congressional Information Service, Inc. **Remaking Japan** belongs in all modern Asian studies collections and in any program involving the history of military government and civil affairs operations.

Further information on the period is given in a collection of recent papers edited by Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, **Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation** (Univ. of Hawaii Press, 1987). These papers neatly supplement the Cohen volume, with 13 scholars covering other aspects of the newly emerging Japanese government under the American occupation.

Michael O. Shannon
Bronx, N.Y.

The Superpowers in Crisis: Implications of Domestic Discord by Richard J. Krickus, Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Books, Inc., 1987, 227 pages, $14.95.

Richard Krickus claims three goals for his discourse: to identify the critical internal problems threatening the very existence of the Soviet Union; to identify the serious, though noncritical, domestic problems of the United States which, unabated, could adversely affect its national security; and to examine the potential of either or both of the preceding issues to foster superpower confrontation. The author remains faithful to these self-acclaimed objectives, at least in structure, but is less than convincing in execution.

A central concept in the comparison of the superpower rivals carried throughout the work is the distinction between a "societal crisis," which allegedly is engulfing the Soviet Union, and a "predicament," a somewhat milder form of socio-cultural influenza afflicting the United States. Left untreated, predicaments become crises. This highly simplistic differentiation is important to what follows since acceptance of it implies the

United States can redress its inbalances through rather minor adjustments that leave the basic political system and most of the incumbent elites intact. The Soviet Union, by contrast, is argued to be beyond that point, indeed, may well have been since the consolidation of Bolshevik power.

The bulk of the text catalogs a rather familiar litany of internal problems besetting the two greatest world powers. In fairness, the elucidation of Soviet economic problems and those of ethnic origin can be instructive to any who still see the Russians as an undifferentiated mass of industrious Communists bent on world domination. The vista Krickus presents is far more accurate than that spawned by the Cold War or the braggadocio of Soviet propagandists. If one knows nothing of the complexity of the Soviet Union, there's something of value to be learned here. On the other hand, the author wanders onto highly speculative turf by positing remotely possible scenarios as probable outcomes of the Soviet situation, given that the disease has progressed to the "crisis" stage. One is reminded of the Hundred Years' War during which the Protestant and Catholic protagonists hoped and fully expected a series of unspeakable plagues and misfortunes would befall the other side. Perhaps after three centuries it is still human nature to expect a power greater than ourselves to change that which we cannot and always to a conclusion we prefer.

The author opens his discussion of the American "predicament" with a very summary tracing of our evolution from 18th century liberalism to the troublesome times of the late 1970's. The remainder of this brief third of the book quickly becomes a thinly disguised critique of the Reagan Administration. Though perhaps valid in another context, this choice of direction lends small support toward upholding the second goal of the book. The disappointing character of this segment of the thesis also fails to prove why the American ills pose less danger to our political order than are those facing the Russians. Indeed, one might argue that the "Soviet Empire" of today is but a chronological extension of the Russian Empire that preceded it and survived intact since the time of Catherine the Great. In that context, the United States has far less experience and tradition to draw upon in dealing with its internal malaise and, thus, may be in greater danger of political implosion. Ultimately one must accept the categorization of the Soviet Union in "crisis" and the U.S. in "predicament" as either self-evident or because the author says so.

The final segment of this treatise presents no compelling argument that the internal problems of either superpower will lead to a dreadful confrontation with the other. At most, one is left to conjecture along with the author as to what recklessness either side might attempt should the other show signs of advanced internal decay. How ironic it would be if, the dangers of nuclear war aside, such an exercise in opportunism would just as likely revitalize the collapsing entity with an infusion of nationalism when most needed. Krickus foretells no early demise for either superpower under present conditions, and in this we are in full agreement.

Major James G. Borowski
Hanover, Md.

Diplomacy and Revolution: G. V. Chicherin and Soviet Foreign Affairs, 1918-1930, by Timothy Edward O'Connor, Ames, Iowa: Iowa State Univ. Press, 1988, 250 pages, $24.95.

How the Bolshevik revolution ever occurred has fascinated the West. How the Soviet government after the revolution established itself in a diplomatically hostile world is an equally intriguing question. Timothy O'Connor's **Diplomacy and Revolution**, a biography of Georgii Vasil'evich Chicherin, Soviet commissar of foreign affairs, 1918-1930, sifts through impressive source materials, much previously unused in the West, to answer the latter question.

Many Bolsheviks who expected the socialist revolution to spread throughout Europe believed that diplomacy was unnecessary for their revolutionary government. But, the revolution did not sweep Europe. Therefore, Chicherin had to construct Soviet Russia's policy for peaceful relations in a hostile environment and give the Soviet government time to restore its economy and consolidate its political position.

A remarkably talented and private man, Chicherin was once described as, "one great man who does not diminish as you come closer to him." His greatest attribute was his ability to work long hours, a habit developed as an emigre working through the night. Many diplomats were astounded by his memory. He possessed an encyclopedic mind for historic, geographic and biographical data. He dictated letters and memorandums in several languages. Preferring private conversations, quiet diplomacy, he did not like diplomatic receptions or large public gatherings. He developed a genuine friendship with Lenin and gave Lenin credit for the overall direction of Soviet foreign affairs. Although he did not create Soviet foreign policy, Chicherin set the style for and contributed to the prestige of Soviet diplomacy during the 20's.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ended any hope that the Allies harbored about recreating a second front and bringing the Russians back into the war against Germany.

Lenin's policy of exploiting and taking advantage of inherent contradictions and divisions among the capitalist powers became especially noticeable after the Allies signed the Treaty of Versailles with Germany in 1919. Chicherin began to perceive Germany as a potential ally for Soviet Russia against Britain and France. Germany's fear of reparation demands from Soviet Russia created strange bedfellows. The Polish-Soviet War was a turning point in Soviet diplomatic history, it effectively underminded Allied unity toward Soviet Russia and produced a split between France and Britain.

Chicherin's peace campaign laid the foundation of Soviet foreign policy during the 1920's to provide a needed breathing space. He wrote about the importance of peaceful coexistence designed to obtain credits and foreign technical specialists to assist with industrialization. Gorbachev's efforts, today, suggest a parallel need for a high technology economy without an arms race.

The Red Army desperately needed modern military equipment which Soviet industries, in disrepair and lacking sophisticated technology, could not provide. While there were rumors of secret military provisions to the Treaty of Rapallo, most historians contend that it contained no secret clauses. The Reichswehr seeking an outlet for military development pursued an agreement independent of the Treaty. The Treaty of Rapallo was a great diplomatic and moral triumph for Chicherin and the Soviet Republic. It marked the high point of his diplomatic career. The author very clearly develops the brief relationship between the two country's military, however, no details for the professional soldier.

Chicherin disagreed with the direction of Stalin's foreign policy. Stalin believed war with the west was inevitable. Chicherin argued that Stalin mistakenly continued to depict the capitalist world as divided into competing nation-states. Chicherin believed that World War I witnessed the emergence of a new, more advanced state of capitalism, a phenomenon of multinational economic corporations with enormous political power dominated by a small financial oligarchy.

Chicherin and Stalin did not get along personally. Stalin despised the cultured and educated. Chicherin had only contempt for Stalin's mind and methods. Suffering from diabetes, Chicherin's failing health helped Stalin move aside the wearisome diplomat.

Dismissed from office in 1930, he lived isolated and forgotten until his death in 1936. In 1962, Andrei Gromyko rehabilitated Chicherin as one of the leading diplomats in Soviet history. In a very interesting, easily read book, O'Connor concludes Chicherin's diplomacy was a successful combination of traditional Russian geopolitical interests, with unswerving devotion to the socialist goals of the Soviet state.

Lieutenant Colonel Richard N. Armstrong
Fort Hood, Texas

519th Military Intelligence Battalion

(Tactical Exploitation)(Airborne)

The 519th Military Intelligence Battalion crest focuses on the use of scholarly, technical skills to exploit the enemy. The sphinx, a cunning, inquisitive woman with the body and strength of a lion, challenges the enemy to answer truthfully and completely. The open book represents knowledge of the enemy through the mastery of world languages and culture. The globe illustrates the worldwide scope of the Battalion's mission and intelligence contributions. The colors of blue and gold are traditional for Military Intelligence. Blue signifies vigilance and loyalty. Gold symbolizes the Sun God, Helios, who could see and hear everything. The 519th Military Intelligence Battalion lives its motto, "STRENGTH THRU INTELLIGENCE."

The 519th Military Intelligence Battalion (Tactical Exploitation) (Airborne), provides general support to XVIII Airborne Corps, general support reinforcement to Division MI Battalions (CEWI) and direct support to separate combat maneuver brigades. The Battalion is capable of simultaneously deploying airborne, air assault and mechanized company teams with signal and mechanical maintenance, interrogation, counterintelligence, signal security, operations security and electronic warfare jamming, intercept and direction finding capabilities.

The Battalion was activated on October 15, 1948, at Fort Riley, Kan., as a Field Army unit. During the Korean War, elements participated in seven campaigns and earned a Meritorious Unit Commendation and two Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citations. The Battalion was inactivated in 1954. On January 25, 1958, the Battalion was reactivated at Fort Bragg, N.C. With the breakout of the Vietnam Conflict, the capabilities of the 519th were deployed to the Republic of South Vietnam. The Battalion distinguished itself by participating in 16 campaigns, earning three Meritorious Unit Commendations. As Vietnamization progressed in 1972, the Battalion was designated for redeployment back to Fort Bragg. During subsequent years the Battalion's organization was changed with the inactivation of Companies C and D. In September 1978 the Battalion reorganized basically to today's structure: Headquarters and Headquarters Service Company, Company A (Interrogation) and Company B (Operations Security). The Forces Command Intelligence Training Detachment, chartered to train Reserve and National Guard units nationwide, was attached to the Battalion in April 1981. On April 16, 1982, the 519th MI Battalion (Field Army) was reorganized and redesignated as the 519th MI Battalion (Tactical Exploitation). As a Tactical Exploitation Battalion, Company C (Electronic Warfare) was identified for activation and attachment to the Battalion.

In 1983, the Battalion participated in Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, providing interrogation of enemy prisoners of war, counterintelligence and electronic warfare support. Soldiers routinely participate in Corps, Forces Command and JCS directed exercises worldwide. The 519th adds meaning its motto by providing timely, quality intelligence collection to XVIII Airborne Corps and its subordinate combat forces.


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